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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, there has been a quiet, unanticipated
revolution in western water policy. In the early 1980s, western
water law seemed outmoded. Urbanization and expanding environmental consciousness have put new demands on an old, unyielding system of western water law, and states promised reform to
satisfy changing public demands and values. Although the 1990s
brought change, it came largely through initiatives of the federal
government and local communities. Meanwhile, state law evolved
haltingly at best.
Until recently, the water distribution regime was dominated by
assertions of legal rights rooted in prior appropriation and by construction of physical facilities-mostly federal dams and reservoirs
astride the West's waterways. These utilitarian laws 'and water
projects left a legacy of environmental insult, and today they abrade dynamic new expressions of public values. Attempts by water
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developers to meet expanding water demands were continually
frustrated as they collided with a suite of federal environmental
protection laws passed in the 1970s. When federal water project
subsidy policies abruptly collapsed in response to public environmental sentiment and economic constraints, outraged states argued that the dual impediments of regulation and reduced
subsidies for development undermined their control over the
future.
In the 1980s, progressive leaders in the West urged states to
assume the pivotal role in responding to emerging public values in
water. They recognized that the West was changing and that state
responses could defuse the growing federal influence on western
water policy. Their policy reform agenda included greater efficiency and conservation, conjunctive use of groundwater, protection of instream flows, more comprehensive planning, and
inclusive public participation at the level closest to the resource.
Despite the efforts of reform-minded leaders, state water law
and policy in the West remained essentially static though the
1990s. Yet there were significant changes in the way important
water decisions are made. The most impressive innovations, however, were produced by federal regulatory pressure and locally
based problem-solving efforts, often supported by federal participants. Instead of coming from within the state establishment,
water reform in the 1990s resulted from unconventional, often
place-specific approaches. In other words, change has come from
"outside the box" of traditional institutions.
Western water policy undoubtedly will continue evolving to
meet new public demands. Major stresses on the systemdemographics, competing policy demands, climate variability-will
combine to create crises. In crisis there is opportunity for broader
reform at the state level. As these windows of policy-making opportunity open, state officials may institutionalize new policies that
draw upon the experience of the place-specific problem solving
that is now occurring apart from traditional water institutions.
These outside-the-box approaches, therefore, can serve as laboratories for incubating proposals for systemic change at the state level.
Part H of this article illustrates that, even though the states have
determined the laws governing allocation of water rights, the federal government has always had a powerful influence on western
water policies. Part III reviews the apparent state agenda for water
policy reform offered by the western governors in the mid-1980s,
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then summarizes the comparatively modest state law changes made
during the 1990s, and concludes that the most significant changes
were those that were made "outside-the-box" of traditional state
water institutions. Part IV discusses the future of state water policy
reform. Stresses on water resources caused by demographic
changes, the effects of current policies, and climate variability are
likely to lead to water crises that will offer opportunities to institutionalize the lessons learned from "outside-the-box" reforms.
II.

A MYrH OF FEDERAL
DEFERENCE TO STATE CONTROL OF WESTERN WATER

THE HISTORY OF WESTERN WATER LAW:

When most of the country, and virtually all of the West, was
federal public land, the federal government theoretically could
have dominated the allocation and control of water rights on its
lands. Yet exercising this power would have been practically impossible because the federal presence in the West was too thin. Just as
the federal government tolerated, and later encouraged settlers,
who were little more than trespassers on the public land, to seek
out and develop minerals, it also let them take and use water found
there for mining, agricultural, and domestic uses.'
In the era of western expansion, national economic and social
policy favored development-principally mining and agricultureand the establishment of communities by settlers, all of which demand water. Water was an instrument for realizing that policy.2 If
the settlers in the new territories and states could avoid or resolve
disputes over water by dividing up use rights among themselves,
the federal government was pleased to defer, first by silence on the
subject and later by oblique language in mining and homesteading
laws.' The Supreme Court ultimately held it was the states' prerogative to allocate water on public lands by any system they chose."
But the seminal Rio GrandeIrrigationCompany case 5 made clear that

state-authorized water use must not interfere with federal rights to
protect the flow of the stream and can be superseded by the exercise of federal powers over commerce and public land. 6
1.

SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 88 (3d ed. 1911).
2. See SARAH F. BATES ET AL.., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS 31-33 (1993).
3. See Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1994); Mining Act of 1866, 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1994).
4. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-65
(1935); see also Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 614 (1978).
5. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).

6. Id.
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In general, states adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation,
a laissez-faire system based on the simple notion of first-in-time,
first-in-right. 7 Some states employed the appropriation doctrine in
its purest form, where anyone who initiated a beneficial use of
water received a water right good against anyone whose use was
initiated later. Others modified the doctrine ith requirements for
administratively granted permits. Still other states used a mix of
western prior appropriation law and the riparian law that uras more
typical of the Eastern states.' It was in this context that the Supreme Court validated state autonomy to fashion any t)e of water
rights system chosen by the state, even for allocating water from
the public lands.' The Court thus honored, at least in word, the
idea that states deserve deference in allocating water according to
their own laws.
The western states relied on decisions recognizing their freedom to choose an allocation system to apply within their boundaries to support an "expectation of exclusive and perpetual state
control over water resources."10 But virtually ever), iteration of the
policy of deference was accompanied by citations to Rio Grande,
which had subordinated state control to federal supremacy," and
early cases made it clear that federal preemption of state water law
did not require express legislation. It could be accomplished by
implication, simply by setting aside federal land for purposes that
required water.' 2 Nevertheless, direct federal interference with
state-granted water rights was rare. 3
States included claims to "ownership" of all the water within
their boundaries in their constitutions and statutes.' 4 In effect, this
7. See DAVID H. GErCHES, WATER Lw I% A NtrsiELL 75 (3d ed. 1997).
8. See generally, i&Lat 80-82.
9. See California-OregonPower Co., 295 U.S. at 163-65.
10. Charles T. DuMars & A. Dan Tarlock, New Challengs to State WaterAllocation Sorereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 331, 334 (1989).
11. See, eg., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978); United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 298 (1940); California.OregonPawer Co., 295
U.S. at 155.
12. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); see aLso Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
13. See B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition IS7ld fest Style, 17 SrT..
L REV. 1 (1964)
(arguing that political forces forestalled the exercise of federal preemption); Charles F.
Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition,56 U. CoLo. L RE%, 317, 325 (1985) (recognizing the need to accommodate legitimate state and federal interests when shaping water
policy).
14. 1 WELS A. HuTcHiNs, WATER RIGHTS Lws INTHE Nit Er WFSrEmN SLrTEs 5-13
(1971).
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was an assertion of state authority to supervise the allocation of
water, usually made in the context of protecting the public's interest in achieving maximum benefit from the use of a public resource.1 5 It was this function that the courts firmly acknowledged,
without a hint that federal laws or policies would have any less preemptive force in water resource management than in any other
field. Yet the states seemed to assume greater autonomy, and references to "state primacy" that dominated discussions of the federal
role in water matters conveniently ignored the reality of federal

supremacy. 16
The myth of state control has always been precarious, depending as it does on congressional forbearance in the exercise of federal preemption. Federal legislation routinely recited that it shall
not "be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water."1 7 Even where
federal laws appeared to preserve state water laws, the overriding
purpose of the federal law controlled. The Supreme Court has
held, in case after case, that such disclaimers mean nothing in the
face of a federal purpose that conflicts with state water rights."'
Thus, federal programs ranging from dam-building to environmental regulations can inhibit or preclude the operation of state
water law and state-granted water rights whenever there is a conflict between the state legal system and the federal purpose.1 9 Most
federal environmental laws have allowed citizen suits, giving a voice
to environmentalists who had been excluded from water decisions
in the past.2" The expansion of federal environmental laws and the
increasing scarcity of water for all uses in a growing West has made
such conflicts more frequent and sometimes bitter.
15. Id.
16. See DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 10, at 332-36.
17. Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994). See also 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (g) (1994).
18. California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). But see California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645 (1978) (noting that the legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 indicates
Congress intended to defer to state water law not in direct conflict with the Act).
19. E.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
20. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (1994). See generallyJeannette L.
Austin, The Rise of Citizen Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Privateand Public
Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 220 (1987).
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The TraditionalRole of State Water Institutions in the Wst

Water policy was straightforward in the early days of the West.
It dealt initially with water allocation and later with water development, distribution, and related planning. Accordingly, state water
institutions made and enforced allocation decisions and developed
and delivered supplies of water. State legal regimes committed
water to uses that prevailed early in the century, primarily mining
and agriculture. The dams and other structures that were built,
mostly with federal dollars, fixed distributional patterns and
further tied water to particular uses and places. These two phenomena-state appropriation doctrine and federal water development-combined to create an inflexible system that was designed
to serve narrow purposes.
Because prior appropriation was conceived as a self-help s)stem, the allocation function required little institutional support.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, appropriators claimed
rights to quantities of water they would develop and use beneficially, and the appropriator who was first in time had the better
right to use water. No local institutions were available to make adjudicative or administrative decisions.
As rivers became fully appropriated early in the twentieth century and competition for water intensified, the prior appropriation
system needed more institutional support. Prior appropriation was
a free-for-all system and water rights records were inadequate and
scattered. States soon felt the need for centralized record keeping.2 1 By the twentieth century, the western states had all expanded the role of water agencies to ensure water was used
lawfully. The relatively specific and narrow functions of water institutions were to recognize property rights carved out of public resources and protect them against interference from other water
interests. Thus, water agencies existed primarily to serve the users
and occasionally to mediate conflicting claims. 2 In an era when
the key issues could be refereed by an official who enforced simple
priorities among rights holders, institutions were unencumbered
by considerations of multiple issues and interests.
Some state laws and institutions were modified to encompass a
21. On the deficiencies of early record keeping, which led to creation of state agencies, see Michael V. McIntire, The Disparity Betume State Wiater Rigtls Records and Actual Use
Patterns-"I Winder Where the Water ient?," 5 LAND & WATER L RE%,. 23 (1970).
22. See CHARLS F. WiuKrsoN, CROSSING THE NXr NMERIDLAN 240.41 (1992) (dcscribing western water agencies as "captured").
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limited consideration of the "public interest," a concept whose
meaning varied from state to state.23 This discretion allowed the
agencies to decide what quantities of water were needed for new
uses and whether new or proposed changes in use were consistent
with the public interest.24 Until recently, however, state engineers
rarely inquired seriously or comprehensively into the public interest, simply determining whether the water would be put to a beneficial use.25 Their determinations were reached with little, if any,
input or participation by members of the public.
B.

The Rise and Fall of Big Dams

In the arid West, where rainfall is infrequent and distances between streams are great, dams and canals were needed to store and
transport water to meet the demands of rising population. Because
they often "appropriated" water far in excess of average annual
flows, water users had rights to water that, without storage, were
only actually available in extraordinarily wet years.26
In the old West, development and distribution of water by
building dams and ditches were initially tasks for an appropriator
acting independently. But water users generally lacked sufficient
capital to build elaborate facilities as well as the cooperation that
was needed to make collective use of resources. Even when private
irrigation enterprises were formed to serve an area, they often
failed for lack of capital and because there was no legal means to
27
force potential beneficiaries to participate in sharing the cost.

California enacted a law permitting the formation of irrigation districts empowered to impose compulsory taxes on landowners. Yet
failures continued because of economic inefficiencies and lack of
23. E.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985) (finding that the state engineer
can consider "any locally important factor" such as water quality, fish and game, health,
economics, etc. as part of the "local public interest"); Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah
1943) (finding that the "public welfare" requirement allows the state to prefer a junior
applicant for water rights with the "more beneficial use" over a senior applicant); Young &
Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910) (finding that "public welfare" includes
consideration of costs of projects for protection of investors as well as consideration of
public health and safety).
24. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 240; Susanne Hoffman-Dooley, Determining 17iat
Is In The Public Welfare in Water Appropriations and Transfers: The Intel Example, 36 NAT. RF.
soURCESJ. 103 (1996).
25. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 240.
26. Donald J. Pisani, To RECLAitI A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, L"V, AND PUBLIC POLI"
1848-1902 37-38 (1992).
27. See John D. Leshy, Special Water Districts-The Historical Background, in SPtCIAL
WATER DisTacrs: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 11, 14 (James N. Corbridge ed., 1983).
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expertise.2" States tried several other approaches, but entities for
collective irrigation in the arid West, other than in early Spanish,
Indian, and Mormon communities, generally did not succeed3The United States Congress established the federal reclamation
program in 1902 to provide federal assistance for wrater development projects and thereby promote the settlement of the West.
Originally, the United States attempted to collect repayment of its
costs of constructing project facilities from the individual irrigators
who used them. Eventually, Congress altered this approach and
recognized special water districts as the exclusive entities with
which it would deal when authorizing and building w-ater
projects."s These districts typically contracted with the Bureau of
Reclamation to operate the projects and to repay the government's
costs with revenues collected from users and property owners in
the district. The districts were endowed with powers normally reserved for governments, such as the prerogative to tax land.3 ' State
law created these special water districts to handle water development, supply, and management at a regional or local level. Today,
some districts perform functions well beyond the provision of irrigation water. Their quasi-governmental status and independence
from state control has caused considerable controversy, but states
32
have done little to curb their autonomy.
For most of the twentieth century, the United States Bureau of
Reclamation was the largest single provider of capital in the form
of subsidized loans and grants for major wrater development
throughout the West."3 Major decisions about size and design of
facilities were left to experts, usually engineers. The day-to-day
tasks of managing and distributing water were conducted by special
districts according to federal regulations and contracts.
The federal government's entry into water development tended
to eclipse the importance of state water law.34 Competition for
28. Id. at 16.
29. HuTrcHNs, supra note 14, at 160.

30. See Leshy supra note 27, at 11-22.
31. See TERRY L ANDERSON, I~rER CIsis: ENDING

THE Pouc" DRotcGirr 46 (1983);
BATES ET At., supra note 2, at 34-35.
32. See genera//.; SPECIAL IVATER Dismars: CHAL.ENGE FOR THE FL'-mw (James N. Corbridge ed., 1983).
33. See JOHN R. MATHER, WATER RFSOURCES: DtswmwtmON, UsE A.ND %L EctE'T
294-97 (1984); WESTEu WATER PoucY RmVEW ADVsoRY CowL'.N, WATER 1% TlE Wsr
CHALLENGE FOR THE N-x-r CENTURY 2-9 (1998) [hereinafter ADVIsoR Co.ts'N, WvrEr iN
THE WEST].

34. See L.wRENcEJ. M.AcDoNNELtL, FROM RECuaTON TO Sus nuA.Bi

Y: WATER, Ac-
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large, federally-funded water facilities was keen and decisions
about the timing and siting of dams became politically charged.
This provided an incentive to do whatever was necessary to participate in federal dam-building programs, including subordination of
state water rights and conforming state policies to comply with federal goals. The primary water policy objective of western politicians for most of the twentieth century was aimed at capturing
federal assistance for water projects. Development of public works
is an attractive arena for politicians because they can deliver tangible results ostensibly for the benefit of their constituents.
Although political rhetoric claimed state authority over water
resources, states and their leaders appeared willing to sacrifice legal and institutional control in exchange for construction of facilities that enabled physical control of water. The states passed
enabling legislation for the districts to be organized so they could
operate the federal projects, but the districts were locally-controlled, enjoyed considerable autonomy under state laws, and typically took control of all water rights in areas to be served by a
project.3 5 Besides requiring subordination of the state-granted
water rights of individual landowners to be served by federal
projects, authorizations occasionally superseded state water law.
These measures were necessary to centralize control over sufficient
water sources to justify the project.
Historically, it is fair to say that most state water planning was
initiated in response to federal programs and the inducement of
federal largesse.3 6 Many "plans" were used simply to identify and
expedite federal water development projects.3 7 Because planning
was supply-oriented, it focused on where to build and how to use
large reclamation projects with little regard for environmental, social, or economic costs. Only a few states adopted comprehensive
approaches to planning that did more than justify federal
38
projects.
A 1965 federal law attempted to promote better, more inte273-80 (1990); PIsANi, supra note
26, at 273-336.
35. See ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEv RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 36-45 (1983).
36. See D. Monte Pascoe, Plans and Studies: The Recent Quest For a Utopia in the Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 391, 398 (1984).
37. David H. Getches, Water Planning- Untapped Opportunity for the Western States, 9 J.
ENERGY L. & POL'Y. 1 (1988).
38. Id. at 25.
RICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST
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grated planning at the river basin level.3 9 States resisted, although
many complied insofar as necessary to secure federal support for
water projects.' As hopes for federal funding waned ith a
change in federal policy in the 1980s, motivation for state uater
planning diminished. In 1981, the federal effort to promote a
more comprehensive approach at the river basin level was
abandoned.4
By the time the federal government demanded a fuller consideration of economic feasibility and environmental impacts as part
of the justification for federal water projects, funding had seriously
declined. Not until the 1970s did a federal law, the National Environmental Policy Act, require federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement before undertaking a major federal
action.' In 1983, the government adopted principles and guidelines that gave significant weight to balancing costs and benefits
and to environmental consequences, s but by then most of the big
federal projects were already completed or undenvay."
In retrospect, the federal dam-building era resulted in states abdicating much control over water ithin their boundaries to the
federal government.' Instead of truly comprehensive planning
that considered the panoply of uses and values inherent in u-ater,
states often did the minimum "planning" necessary to get federal
subsidies. For many years federal law required no more, and therefore most federal projects were constructed without concern for
their environmental consequences. Purely natural values, without
utilitarian focus, were generally neglected. If fish and wildlife, recreation, and flood control were considered at all in planning a federal project, these uses were included as project purposes purely
incidental to agricultural, municipal, and industrial purposes. 46
39. Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 (1994).
40. See HuTrcNs, supra note 14; Getches, supra note 37, at 25-28.
41. Ludwik A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and utemational
Water Law, 36 NAT. REsouRcEsJ. 359, 371 (1996).
42. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4344 (1994).
43. UNTrED STATES WATER RESOURCE COUNCIL, EcoNo.nc AND E-M1RO.N.%tEr,uL PrUN.
cIPLES AND GUIDELLNES FOR WVATER AND RELTED L%.,D RESOURCES LIPEF-rION STUDIES
(1983) [hereinafter EcoN. Am E.Nvri. PRuNcL.Fus].

44. SeeRoDoEYT. SMmi, TROUBLED WATERS: FiNANCING WATER INTHE WI.sr 2 (19M4);
D. Craig Bell et al., Retooling IMstern WIater Management: The Park Ciy Pdniples 31 L%%D &
WATER L REv. 303 (1996).
45. See Pascoe, supra note 36, at 399.

46. RICHARD W%.
WTAH1., LMUXrS FOR FEDER.AL. xTER: SUBSIDIES, PRorEnRr
AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 189 (1989).

Ri rrs,
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The Awakening of Environmental Consciousness and Economic
Rationality

The first half of the twentieth century was an era of rapid population movement, expansion of agriculture, and growth of new cities. The accompanying water development left an indelible mark
on the western landscape. Irrigating arid lands and supplying cities far from rivers were not simple tasks. They required transporting water across large expanses of dry land and storing enough
water to make up for erratic flows from season to season and from
year to year. Today, some 75,000 water storage reservoirs dot the
West.4 7 The United States Bureau of Reclamation constructed 355
of the largest reservoirs plus 16,000 miles of canals.4" The United
States Army Corps of Engineers expanded its role as a navigation
protection agency to include flood control and water supply. Although the Corps' presence was felt mostly in the east and southwest, it took on new responsibilities, especially in the Pacific
Northwest and the Missouri River basin.' Altogether, Reclamation
reservoirs store over 119 million acre-feet of water and Corps reser49
voirs in the West store 103 million acre-feet.
American water development included many remarkable engineering achievements and produced impressive economic rewards.
Bureau of Reclamation hydroelectric facilities generate power that
sells for $700 million per year and irrigation water from the
projects contributes to crop production valued at $9 billion per
year. 0 The projects also produce significant indirect benefits, such
as flood control.
Water development has also had its failures. The anticipated
benefits to agriculture have often fallen short of expectations because the soils and climates of areas served by some projects were
unsuited for intensive irrigation.5 Subsidies of up to 90% of the
47. Christine A. Klein, On Dans and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641 (2000) (public and
private dams at least six feet in height).

48.

CHARLES

F. WILKINSON,

TURE OF THE WEST

CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LXND, WATER, AND THE

Fly.

259 (1992).

49. ADviSORy COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST, supra note 33, at 2-9.

50. See id.
51. For example, impermeable clays create poor soil drainage in a district along Arizona's Gila River causing saline groundwater to destroy crops. The Bureau of Reclamation
undertook multiple, expensive, and ultimately ineffective projects to try to remedy the situation. See David H. Getches, ColoradoRiver Governance: Sharing FederalAuthority as an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 573, 587 (1997). See also MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 7, 481 (1986). Also,

the Kesterson Project in California's Central Valley caused leaching of naturally occurring
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project costs notwithstanding, many farmers could not produce
enough to repay the balance.52 And despite the considerable benefits of development, it is now widely understood that the unintended consequences of water projects were enormous and farreaching:
Dams have flooded valleys and displaced farmers and communities, blocked or disrupted fish migrations, reduced naturally occurring flood frequencies and magnitudes, disrupted natural
temperature fluctuations, altered low flows..., reduced sediment
and nutrient loads, changed channel-sediment characteristics ....
narrowed and shrunk river 53
channels, changed channel patterns
and eliminated flood plains.
Moreover, a recent report concluded that water development has
created the single most significant threat to survival of species."
During the period when most extensive water development as
occurring, the environmental impacts were not formally assessed
and discussed in advance of development as they would be today.
By the 1970s, however, most observers recognized the nature of the
adverse effects of water projects.-" Environmentalists had long decried the damage caused by dams and had won historic battles in
the 1950s and 1960s by stopping three major dams planned for the
Colorado River. 6 While these early victories helped to define the
environmental movement, the official government policy continued to favor subsidized water development. This remained so even
after Congress had passed an impressive array of environmental
protection legislation in the early 1970s.
selenium from irrigated farmlands and accumulation of selenium in the Kesterson Wildlife
Refuge. The water in the refuge eventually became toxic to migratory birds, which incited
costly, yet still not totally effective, responses. See Getcles, supra note 37, at 20; Laura H.
Kosloff, Comment, Tragedy at Kesterson ReservoirDeath of a 17ldlife Refuge IllustratesFailingsof
lWaterLaw, 15 ENvrl. L REP. 10386 (1985).

52. See BATES

Er A.,

supranote 2, at 36.

53. ADVISORY COMM'N, Wrzaw IN THE WrST,supra note 33,. at 2-13.
54. Elizabeth Losos et al., Taxpayer-SubsidizedResourceExtractionHarms Spes, 45 BtoSciENcE 446, 448 (1995). The researchers examined the impacts of a variety of resource
extraction activities on endangered species, including grazing, mining, logging, recreation,
and water development. Water development was found to be the activity that affected the
greatest number of species.
55. See ADvisoRY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST, supra note 33, at 2-12 to 2-13; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, ManagingReclamation Facilitiesfor &os stemn Benefit, 67 U. Coo. L
REv. 197, 200 (1996).
56. See REisNER, supra note 51, at 300; BATEs ET .u., supra note 2, at 43-47.
57. See, eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401- 7 671(q) (1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1784 (1994); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
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In 1977, Jimmy Carter became President and initiated inexorable changes in federal water policy. For westerners interested in
water issues, the hallmark of Carter's presidency was the infamous
"hit list," targeting thirty-three water projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of Engineers for elimination from the federal
budget."8 Congress had already approved construction of these
elaborate systems of dams, irrigation, and hydropower facilities in
the West, and they had taken on an aura of birthright for the states
involved. When the new Administration announced that the
projects were doomed by intolerable environmental impacts or unacceptable benefit-cost ratios there was an outcry from western politicians and development interests. Governor Richard Lamm wrote
in his book, The Angry West

However well-intentioned it may have been, the Carter hit list was
a study in federal arrogance. Its assumptions were questionable,
its conclusions were faulty; it was riddled with anti-western
prejudice and wrapped in anti-western ignorance. It reflected no
understanding of western conditions, of western people, of the
nature of their lives, or of the relentless crushing aridity that
shapes their land and everything in it.59
Lamm's unvarnished criticism of the Carter hit list was consistent
with antagonism toward federal policies being voiced by many of
his fellow governors, including then-Governor Bruce Babbitt.60
Carter's message was clear. Because the proposed federal
projects could not be economically justified and would cause environmental problems at least as serious as their predecessors, they
must not be built. The Bureau of Reclamation touted its program
as one that paid its own way, but in reality most projects were heavily subsidized.61 Several of the projects on the hit list had benefitcost ratios less favorable than 1:1.62 Subsidized federal water

projects had originally been accepted in order to promote the Reclamation Act's purpose of aiding growth in the West, 63 but by the

1980s that goal had been realized. Moreover, benefit-cost analyses
had understated the full costs to the rest of the nation. In addition
58. See Alexandra M. Shafer, The ReclamationReform Act of 1982: Reform or Replacement7,
45 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 647, 666 (1984).
59. RicHARD D. LMm & MICHAEL McGAITy, THE ANGRY WEsT 188-89 (1982).

60. See Dan Balz, DemocratsFeel a Cold PoliticalWind BlowingFrom the West, WAsH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1981, at Al; William E. Schmidt, 3 Governors in the West Weighing "New Federalism,"
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1982, at A10.

61. See WAHL, supra note 46, at 27-46.
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id at 13-23.
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to monetary costs, inefficient land use and water use led to costs
that were less quantifiable, but no less real. Damage to natural systems was enormous. The public was becoming deeply concerned
about major environmental problems, many of which were traceable to federal water projects.64 Moreover, the Reclamation program raised questions of interregional equity, as crop production
was promoted by federal expenditures in the irrigated areas of the
West rather than in other, more fertile and humid regions.6'
President Carter's bold initiative put an end to many proposed
water projects and ultimately prevailed as national policy. Although Congress defeated a few of Carter's requests to eliminate
projects, the thrust of the policy was maintained in the policies of
the Reagan and Bush Administrations. As a result, federal wrater
projects that did not meet very conservative criteria and did not
have significant state or local funding were effectively dead. 6 The
hit list was, at the time, considered a political blunder of epic proportions, but history should rightly mark it as signaling the end of
the era of federal dam-building in the United States and perhaps a
visionary policy.
The demise of the federal government's role in dam building
did not, however, decrease federal influence on water policy.6 7
The same national environmental consciousness that emboldened
the Carter administration to produce the hit list had also inspired a
wave of law-making in the early 1970s that accounts for most of the
environmental laws on the books today. The Clean Water Act,'
Clean Air Act,69 Federal Land Policy and Management Act,7 0 Na64. See, e.g., BATES Er A., supra note 2, at 5-8. In the "new West" an increasingly urban
populace favors protecting water quality and environmental uses of water, even where it
conflicts with development of water for urban uses. Id. at 73-89.
65. Id. at 22.
66. SeeSmrrH, supra note 44, at 143; Eco. ANo E-vr'.. Piu.aPLrs, supra note 43; State
ex reL Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 249 (N.M. App. 1993) (noting that the principles
and guidelines were "so conservative that... no project was ever approved"). Although the
Reagan Administration, under the banner of the "New Federalism," promised to remedy
the trend toward greater federal control, it actually shifted burdens to the states for costsharing for construction of water resources projects and reduced the federal share of
grants for waste-water treatment facilities, with little devolution of control to the states. See
Peter Rogers, America's Water. Federal Roles and Responsibilities 179-80 (1993).
67. Although the government is involved in fewer major water projects than in te
past, controversy continues over its role in projects that are considered to be environmentally destructive and wasteful. See generall, JEFF STEIN rr AE., TRoL'LFz WATERS. COGRPESS,
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND WASTEFUL WxrATR PROJECrS (2000).
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
70. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
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tional Forest Management Act,7 ' Endangered Species Act,7 2 and
many others were passed into law in the space of a few years. These
laws created a new kind of federal presence. In the preceding half
century, the federal government had profoundly influenced where
western water was used and for what purposes. With water project
funding being curtailed even as its regulatory presence loomed
larger, the federal government was left holding all sticks and no
carrots.
Even before these historic changes "state primacy" was, in truth,
never much more than a shibboleth of western politicians. Most
important decisions and responsibilities were ceded to or assumed
by the federal government or by special districts. State water law
was simply a framework for allocating rights in the first instance, so
unembellished by rules and so inflexible that it did not effectively
serve modern needs or help solve water problems.
III.

THE MOVEMENT TO REFORM WESTERN WATER POLICY:

A

RECORD OF UNSATISFIED AMBITION

Western water law as manifested in prior appropriation law had
served the purposes of an earlier era of western settlement and utilitarian goals, but had not kept pace with evolving social and economic values. Federally subsidized water development had assisted
in distributing water more widely, but created problems of its own.
The state role remained essentially administrative and did not address those problems. These deficiencies were recognized in reports and studies beginning in the 1950s." s By the 1990s, the
literature in the field created a chorus of reform ideas and recommendations with remarkable similarities.74 The principles that
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994).
72. Id. §§ 1531-1544.
73. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-29 (1961); H.R. Doc. No. 84-315 (1956); H. R. Doc. No,
84-208 (1955); H.R. Doc. No. 81-122 (1949); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WATER AND
CHOICE IN THE COLORADO BASIN: AN EXAMPLE OF ALTERNATIVES IN WATER MANAGEMENT
(1968); NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1973).
74. See, e.g., BATES ET AL., supra note 2; LONG'S PEAK WORING GROUP ON NATIONAL
WATER POLICY, AMERICA'S WATERS: A NEW ERA OF SUSTAINABILITY (1992), reprinted in 24
ENVrL. L. 125, 128 (1994); MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR
REVoLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER (1990); WATER QUALITY 2000, A NATIONAL WATER
AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. FINAL REPORT (1992) [hereinafter WATER QUAuTY2000];
WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL

EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRON.
MENT (1992); Zach Willey & Tom Graft, Federal Water Policy in the United States-An Agenda
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,

for Economic and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 325 (1988).
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animated the water policy reform movement were conservation,
equity, ecology, and the need for balancing these values within established water allocation and management regimes.7 5
Public consciousness of the need for reform expanded, but
calls to satisfy changing demands and newly appreciated values met
the inflexibility of the system. Popular concern for environmental
quality was continually manifested in opinion polls and had been
codified in federal laws.7 6 It was widely understood that the era of
federally subsidized water projects had ended and that the principal role of the federal government in water had been transformed
from water development to setting and enforcing environmental
standards. Nevertheless, official forums for integrating the public's
views into state water decisions were lacking. State law continued
to deal primarily with rules for allocation and administration of
rights to use water. In fact, beyond leaving appropriators free to do
as they pleased, state water law reflected little true "policy." Some
growing western cities and industries, however, could see the advantages of supporting the new concern for quality, if only as a
means of alleviating supply problems and facilitating more inclusive solutions to environmental conflicts, and they joined in the
call for reform.7 7
The states jealously resisted any threat to the central role they
had always asserted in western water matters. Aiming to forestall
an increased federal regulatory presence, they proposed to make
changes in their own systems sufficient to satisfy an expanding public demand for protection of environmental and social values,
while also responding to the demands of a growing urban population. At the same time, the states pressed the federal government
to become involved and to furnish financial support for negotiated
settlements of Indian water rights claims.78
Instead of seizing the opportunity to use state-initiated reforms
to supplant the need for federal regulation, states made mostly ad
hoc responses that were provoked by perceptions of a threat or
crisis, often related to urban growth and federal regulatory requirements. The most innovative problem-solving by-passed established
state water institutions and sometimes led to the establishment of
75. See BATESsEr A., supra note 2, at 178-98 (urging that these principles are the
ingredients of a "water ethic").
76. See Md at 73-89, 156.
77. See WATER QuAL' 2000, supra note 74 (report sponsored by industry group).
78. DANiEL MCCOOL, COM.!tLND oF THE W TERs 239 (1987).
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new, ad hoc institutions or processes. Moreover, the federal government-either by its participation in or support of these efforts,
or by virtue of federal regulatory pressures-became a catalyst in
the evolution of western water policy and today is the single most
powerful force for change. Consequently, the importance of traditional state water institutions in the water policy in the 1990s declined markedly.
A.

The Promise of the 1980s: Western Governors Sow Seeds of Reform

The Western Governors Association, led by Bruce Babbitt of Arizona and Richard Lamm of Colorado, recognized that times had
changed and that in order for state policies to remain relevant,
they had to be reformed.79 The trends were clear. If dams were
going to be built, it would have to be with state or private funds.
However, even if the states could raise the money to build their
own dams-and this was a time of declining state revenues-they
would face significant regulatory obstacles.
Although some governors had criticized the abrupt shift in the
federal role, they realized that these federal policy changes were
inexorable and that water policy needed to address evolving social
values. Consequently, progressive governors first accepted that it
was no longer feasible to respond to water scarcity by expanding
supplies; instead, demand for water had to be controlled. Second,
they recognized that the unspoiled resources defining the West's
essential character had to be protected. Finally, they perceived
that states had an opportunity to supplant the need for widening
federal regulation.
The governors assumed leadership in a growing movement for
reform of western water policy. The movement included the Western Governors Association (WGA) and eventually the Western
States Water Council (WSWC), an association of water officials and
professionals from the western states.8 0 The WGA passed formal
79. SeeWESTERN GOvRNoRs' ASSOCIATION IVATER EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP, Resolution 86-011 (July 8, 1996), in WATER EFFCIENCY- OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION app. A (1987).
The resolution was signed by Governors George Deukmejian (California), Richard Lamm
(Colorado), George Ariyoshi (Hawaii), Ted Schwinden (Montana), Bob Kerrey (Nebraska), Toney Anaya (New Mexico), George Sinner (North Dakota), Vie Atiyeh (Oregon), William Janklow (South Dakota), Norman Bangerter (Utah), and Booth Gardner
(Washington).
80. WSWC consistently urged deference to state water laws, but became a progressive
voice, suggesting innovations and reforms. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, ANNUAL Rue.,
POSITION No. 208 (1995).
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resolutions committing themselves and their states to a vision of
change."1 The new coalition of western state water experts and political leaders proposed improved water conservation, protection of
instream flows, the integration of quality and quantity management, and the use of markets and pricing mechanisms to make
water allocation more efficient in serving the West's needs. In addition, they began to accept the idea that water decision-making
needed to include a broader variety of interests and fuller public
participation.
These were not truly new ideas; many of them are traceable to
studies and reports initiated by governmental and academic groups
over the preceding thirty years.8 - Yet it was revolutionary for state
officials to embrace them. No one doubted that the prior appropriation doctrine had served reasonably well to promote development in the old West, but it was becoming apparent that without
some reforms, the doctrine was too simple to meet the complex
and multiple demands being put on water law in the new West.
Moreover, the processes for administering the system excluded
participation by members of the public who would represent interests beyond the utilitarian purposes of agricultural, industrial, and
municipal water users.
In 1986, a path-breaking report commissioned by the WGA
called for governors to take the lead in promoting water conservation by working with federal agencies, water users, and others.8 3 It
made the case for management of demand, rather than development of new supplies, as the best way to satisfy water needs while
maintaining quality of life. Specific reforms discussed in the report
included the salvage and transfer of wrater and the substitution of
alternative supplies of water for senior users through exchanges
and other measures. The report found that water marketing was a
means of improving efficiency, but recognized the need for governmental protection of public, community, and environmental
values. A later WGA report elaborated on the need for efficiencyenhancing laws and policies and pressed for federal agencies to be
more active in developing information to facilitate water markets
and protecting environmental values in water.8 4
81.

See BATES Er At., supra note 2, at 178-98.

82. See sources cited supra notes 73-74.
83. BRUCE DRVER, W1VsEPsr WAEP
tRI TuTNvING THE SImT-M, REroRT TO THE WEVSTJV
GOVEROR'S ASSOCIATION FROM THE WATER EFFICiFNcv T.AsK FoRCE 2-5 (1986).
84. VWEsrERN GOVR cNORS'ASSOCLATION WATER EmCiLNcx' WORING GROt'P, W \TE Er.
FICINCY. OPPORTUNMES FOR AcTION (1987) [hereinafter WVGA oN WTER EmaIE-cy.
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The WGA, even as its membership and leadership changed, remained a leader in recognizing the importance of water reform.
Together with the Western States Water Council, in 1991, WGA
sponsored three workshops on western water management in Park
City, Utah, bringing together a diverse group of water experts who
developed a manifesto for western water management known as
the "Park City Principles."8 5
The Park City Principles boldly insisted that the states should
play a pivotal role in bringing about major changes in western
water policy. They called for state laws and policies to recognize a
broader range of interests in water resource values through fuller
public involvement, to take a holistic approach to water problems,
and to develop a framework responsive to economic, social, and
environmental considerations. This would enable broader state
participation in federal policy development and administration,
and change the federal agency role in local problem solving from
prescription to participation. Along with more negotiated and
market-like approaches, these measures sought to minimize the
need for command and control regulation. It is interesting to
note, however, that recommendations for reform usually did not
press the rather obvious linkage between land use and water demand, or the effects of land use on the availability and quality of
86
water resources.
The governors and others urging reform were out in front, and
were sometimes at odds with many traditional voices in water policy. Proposals for nearly any change in western water law were controversial and the constituency supporting change was limited. In
the past, state laws had incorporated departures from the strict
doctrine of prior appropriation in the course of providing incentives for development and creating elaborate statutory programs
for permitting. 87 When it came to reforms that could result in
85. See Bell et al., supra note 44.
86. For an important article on the need to integrate water resources planning and
local land use planning and management, see A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering,
Growth Management and Western Water Law From Urban Oases to Archipelagos,5 IAsTiNcS W.N.W.J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 163 (1999). See also David H. Getches, From Ashkabad, to WellionMohawk, to Los Angeles: TheDrought in Water Policy, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 523 (1993); Kevin M.
O'Brien & Barbara Markham, Tale of Two Coasts: How Two States Link Water and Land Use
Planning, 11 NAT. RESOURCFS & ENV'T 3 (1996).

87. For instance: (1) An early modification of the doctrine altered the most basic
requirement of prior appropriation-that water needs to be diverted before a legal right
exists-and allowed a later diversion to relate back to the time the intent to appropriate
was formed. The purpose was to provide security for investments in water development. See
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sharing decision-making for allocation and use of water, some observers expressed substantial suspicion and resisted almost any
change.' But by the beginning of the 1990s reform seemed inevitable and less ominous. The Park City Principles, as well as the
conclusions of other reports of the WGA and WSWC, coincided
with many of the ideas expressed by earlier task forces as well as the
reform-oriented scholarship of the era. 9
B.

The Record of the 1990s: States ProduceLittle Change

The 1990s began with the states expressing their intentions to
adapt water law and administration to the West's rapidly changing
needs. State politicians apparently embraced the essential reform
proposals, raising expectations for new legislation and aggressive
administrative initiatives that would, in turn, be tested in court.
The stage seemed set for action to encourage greater efficiency
and conservation, such as enacting statutes that promote water re-

use and salvage or requiring low-flow plumbing fixtures. Groundwater law in many states had long needed revision to provide for
conjunctive management with surface waters.9 0 The public was insisting on more effective protection of flowing streams and promoGETcHFs, supra note 7, at 101. (2) Another innovation was the use of the interstate compact when a single state's laws proved inadequate to deal with development and use of
watenvays that crossed state lines. SeeJERo,,m C. MLns, INTERSTATE VTER ComPAcrs: TlE
INTERSTATE COMPACr AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT (National Water Commission, Le-

gal Study No.14, 1971). (3) All states enacted laws providing for administratively issued
permits to use water, except Colorado which uses specialized iater courts to perform a
similar fimcdon. See A. DAN T.A.RLocK, J. ts N. CORBRIDGE & D.wiD H. CErcts, WTmrn
RESOURCE
ANAGEiENT. A CSEBOOK IN Lsw AND Pinuc Pouc" 236-37 (4th ed. 1993). (4)
At least some changes in the basic state water la s in the West, such as laws to protect
instream flows, responded to demands for change that were not primarily development
oriented. SeeA Dan Tarlock, Appropriationfor Instream low Mainterance:A PogressIRiprt on
?Wew' Public Western WaterRights, 1978 UTAH L REV. 211.
88. See PAT O'TooLE, A BLUEPRINT FOR E cEa-V WE TER. Pouv r TIE WESr.. A.
ALTER ATIVE TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE WESTERN

VATER

Poucv Anvisony Co.%tttssion,

in ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST, supra note 33, at B-14; Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.,
Ecological Integriy, New Western Mytk A Critique of tie Longs Peal, Report, 24 Ert .r L 157
(1994); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Tie Rductant Marriage The Next Generation (A Responsae to
Charles Milkinson), 21 ENvTL. L 1087 (1991).
89. See sources cited supra notes 79-80.
90. See KENNmu J. BURKE, ET At, INTERsTTE AI.oaTIox ANiD %ML-.F_%-r OF NoN.TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER: A DISCUssION PAPER PREPRED FOR THE WESTERN GoVTPNO
AssoCIATION 129; UNrrED STATES AiwisoRV COMMISSION ON INvER.O\vERNtE %-rL
REL
TIONS, COORDINATING WATER RESOURCES IN THE FEDERAL. S vTss: TIIE GROVNDWAT-StRFACE WATER CON'NECTION 27-49 (1991). "The term 'conjunctive use' refers to the joint use

or management of groundwater and surface water sources." Gurcirs, supra note 7, at 276;
see generaly, id. at 276-87.
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tion of other elements of the public interest. Some states had
already begun efforts to improve state water planning to make it
more comprehensive and inclusive. 1 The states' agenda2 also included easing barriers to water transfers and marketing.1
As the governors apparently understood, and other state political leaders should have appreciated, a key to replacing federal controls was the creation of innovative state programs to respond to
the public's demands for water reform. When states had gone beyond, but not conflicted with, federal programs in attempting to
protect public values, their efforts had been sustained. For example, the Supreme Court upheld state requirements for releases of
water from a federally licensed dam to protect water quality9 3 and
state water right permit limitations on filling a federal reservoir in
order to protect fish, wildlife, and recreation below the dam.9"
Actual political and legal developments at the state level in the
1990s, however, fell short of the expectations that seemed realistic
in the late 1980s. Instead of staying ahead of federal regulatory
pressures, the states responded with modest adjustments when they
faced controls that seemed intolerable or when they thought that
growth was creating imminent shortages. As this section shows,
most changes in state law and policy were far from visionary;
rather, they were necessary responses to immediate problems.
State systems now risk obsolescence as some of the most important water issues in the West are being entrusted to unconventional
federally and locally-driven processes. The decline in the influence
of state water institutions is ironic not only because of the timehonored myth of "state primacy" in water, but because at the beginning of the decade, the states seemed ready to take leadership in
promoting change. The following summary of state legislation and
court decisions concerning each of the major areas of water policy
that were targeted for reform in the 1980s reveals the rather modest results produced from 1989-1999.11
91. See Getches, supra note 37, at 28-32.
92. See ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER INTHE

WEST,

supra note 33, at 3-22. See also BONNIE

G. COLBY ET AL., TRANSFERRING WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATEs-A COMPARISON OF

PoLICIES AND PROCEDURES (U. Colo. Nat. Resources L. Center, Occasional Paper Series,

Feb. 1989).
93. See Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994)
(finding that Clean Water Act purposes are served by state instream flow requirements for
fish).
94. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (finding that a state can impose permit limits on the federal government that are consistent with Reclamation Act).
95. Data in this section were compiled as follows. First, all western state statutory en-
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Conservation and efficiency.

The inefficient use of huge quantities of water in agriculture is
notorious, and the documented benefits of conserving water are
great.9 6 In addition, cities have opportunities to save water
through pricing methods and improved plumbing. Yet after the
western governors identified a concrete agenda for legal changes,
most states did little to promote water use efficiency. It is, however,
the area where, at least in the aggregate, the most state reform has
taken place through legislative actions and judicial decisions.
Kansas, for example, passed a law requiring water conservation
plans of all water users,9 7 and Texas now requires a state wrater conservation plan." The Washington Supreme Court has held that
when rights are adjudicated they can be limited to the amount
used over time in a reasonably efficient manner."9 This allows a
court to reduce the quantity of a water right from the original
amount to the amount used with reasonableeffwieno, even if the full
amount of the water right has been used.
A few states passed laws encouraging salvage of wasted irrigation water. Montana's law allows appropriators who conserve water
to make use of the salvaged water, i.e., the reduction in the amount
actments and appellate court decisions for the period that apparently dealt with uter law
were compiled for the period 1989-1999. Data from 1989 were included in order to cover
slighdy more than a ten year period (rather than covering slightly less than ten )ears, since
the research was conducted during 1999). Second, the resulting list was checked against
three secondary sources that periodically report on recent developments in uter law- (1)
American Bar Association's Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law (University of Tulsa College of Law); (2) Water Strategist (Analysis of Water Marketing, Finance,
Legislation and Litigation) (Stratecom, Inc., Claremont, Cal.); and (3) Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation Water Law Newsletter (Denver, Colo.). These sources were consulted to identify any omissions (e.g., an uncodified appropriation of funds in connection
with interstate water marketing), and to utilize the reporters' expertise in evaluating the
significance of the legislation. Finally, a subset of these legal developments tit, in the
author's view, constitute "reform" were identified. Undoubtedly, some developments that
others would have included have been omitted. Court decisions are included because
courts implement and sometimes even make water policy by interpreting and enforcing
legislative and administrative decisions.
96. SeeDwvER, supra note 83, atv, 4-6; David H. Getches, iter UseEffidenet: The VIahle
of Water in the West, 8 PUB. L-AND L RE,. 1, 12-13 (1987); StevenJ. Shupe, Muste in llten
Water Law: A Blueipintfor Change, 61 OR. L RE%,. 483 (1982).
97. 1991 Ran. Sess. Laws, 292 § 4 (amending K%--,. ST.%T. AN. 82.a-732 (1989)) (stating that annual water use reports are required to use existing water rights).
98. TEx. WATER CODE A.,,. § 16.051(a) (Vernon 2000) (describing state plan for
water conservation).
99. State of Washington v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051-52 (Wash. 1993) (limiting
quantity of adjudicated rights by "reasonable efficiency").
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of water they consume.1 °° This reform had been urged in Montana
and elsewhere. 0 1 Oregon liberalized the definition of salvaged
water, which had been confined to water that was irretrievably
lost, 10 2 and amended its conservation incentive program to allow
water users who had begun conserving but had not applied to be in
the program to be included retroactively.10 3 New Mexico stopped
short of allowing transfers of salvaged water, but declared that conserved water will not be forfeited for nonuse.1 0 4 Washington authorized counties to create boards to undertake water conservation
and efficiency improvements and to pursue redistribution and
transfer of salvaged water.1 05 Arizona and Colorado passed laws
promoting low flow plumbing fixtures.10 6 Nevada enabled Clark
County to regulate the artificial lakes that have proliferated at golf
courses and casinos around Las Vegas. 10 7 Utah's actions were essentially hortatory, such as a resolution encouraging conservation l1 and a requirement that water providers update conservation
plans periodically.10 9
California's water conservation efforts and results during the
1990s stand out in comparison to those of other states. During this
time, it produced the most significant legislation in the West and
freed up enough water for millions of additional people. As the
state continues growing well beyond the capacity of its water resources, reuse becomes an ever more pressing necessity. The understandable distaste that people may have for drinking water that
they might have flushed down the toilet the day before has been
overcome by the scientific reality that water can be cleaned and
recycled without sacrificing health or aesthetics. California
lawmakers passed new laws almost every year in the decade to en100. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-102(15), 85-2-402(2) (e), 85-2-419 (1999) (stating that
salvaged water can be used by appropriators who conserve).
101. See WGA ON WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 84; see also DIVER, supra note 83.
102. 1993 Or. Laws 641 (amending OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.470, 537.480, 537.485,
537.490, 537.495, 540.510).
103. 1999 Or. Laws 3.94 (amending OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.463-500) (allowing water
rights holder to retain 75% of conserved water for use or sale and reverts 25% to state).
104. 1998 N.M. Laws 37 (H.B. 460) (amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (Mitchie
1998) (protecting conserved water rights from forfeiture due to nonuse).
105. 1996 Wash. Laws 320 §11(2).
106. ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-311 to 45-319 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 9-1.3-102 (Supp. 2000)).
107. NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.030 (YEAR).
108. S.J. Res. 4, 54th Leg., 1st Sess (Utah 1999).
109. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-10-32 (Supp. 1999).
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courage water recycling.110 For example, the Legislature required
that standards for gray water-bath and wash xw-ater-be set for
residences."' Another law declares that using potable water is
wasteful if reclaimed water is available. 2 And districts in southern
California have designed programs that generate hundreds of
thousands of acre-feet of water per year13 by reclaiming wastewater
and using it to replenish groundwater.'
2.

Groundwater.

States made some minor advances in laws dealing with groundwater. Perhaps the most significant was the long-awaited legislation
in Nebraska recognizing that water pumped out of wells which are
hydrologically connected to a surface stream must be conjunctively
managed with the water from the stream."' That is, the legislature
finally conceded hydrologic reality and joined most other states by
managing water coming from the same source, whether it is diverted above ground directly from a stream or by a well tapping a
connected aquifer. Farther west, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that the state's policy of treating water that is subflow of a
stream as groundwater subject to prior appropriation, while governing percolating underground water under the rule of reasonable use, was an artifice that had been rejected by most other
110. A.B.609, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1998 Cal. Legis. Sery. ch. 16+4 (amending Qu..
13,575-13,576, 13,579-13,581) (authorizes feasibility study of pro iding recycled water for groundwater replenishment and allows agreements between groundater
replenishment agencies and recycled water wholesalers for the use of recycled %,-ater for
groundwater replenishment); A.B. 541, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (amending
CAL. WATER CODE § 13271, and adding Cu. WnTR CODE §§ 13529, 13529.2. 13529A)
(treated recycled water exempt from the definition of "seage," alloing it to be used to
;
supplement water supplies); 1994 Cal. Legis. Semv. 733 (West) (amending Cu.. "NV
CODE §§ 13575, 13576 and adding Ct. WATER CODE §§ 13579, 13580, 13581, 13582)
(water suppliers must identify potential recycled water uses within their service areas); 1993
Cal. Legis. Serv. 980 (West) (amending CA.. VAER CODE §§ 13552.4 and 13552.8 (reclaimed wvater use must be considered in planning); 1993 Water Recycling Act, 1991 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 187 (West) (amending CAJ.. WATER CODE §§ 13050 and 13241 and adding ch.
WVATER CODE §§

7.5 (commencing with § 13575)) (use of new water is waste if reclaimed uter available).
111. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 226 (West) (adding CuL. WVATr CODE § 14875) (agency
can adopt graywater standards for residential systems).
112. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 980 (West) (amending Ct. Wxrr CODE § 13554.2 and
adding §§ 13552.2, 13552.6) (using potable water).

113. See, eg., San Diego Area Waste Water Management District Act, ci. 803, § 1,
Stats. )1992) (codified as amended at Ct. WxTR CODE APP. § 133-415(h) (West 1992)).
114. LB. 108,94th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 1996) (amending various water statutes, and
specifically NEB. Rm. STAT. § 46-656) (groundwater hydrologically connected to surface
water to be conjunctively administered if use of that water is affecting or is likely to affect
surface water supplies).
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states. 1 15 The Court refused, however, to change the rule judicially

because of reliance interests.
Texas law has always held to the antiquated idea that an overlying landowner has absolute ownership of groundwater, 16 ignoring
the fact that pumping can affect surface flows and rights to use
them.' 17 The "rule of capture," allowing pumpers the right to virtually unregulated pumping from beneath their property, has resulted in some odd and inequitable results in disputes between
surface and groundwater users. The Texas Supreme Court has
even called the rule "harsh and outmoded." 118 Still, it took years of
litigation and the threat of placing a major urban water source
under federal management to motivate effective administrative
and legislative action to correct the situation.
Depletion of the Edwards Aquifer, which supplies San Antonio,
Texas, caused flows to decline in springs that feed the Guadalupe
River. The springs are the habitat of eight federally-listed
threatened or endangered species and the city's water use created
a serious conflict with the federal Endangered Species Act
(ESA)." 9 The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit under the ESA 120 and
while the suit was pending, the Texas legislature passed the Edwards Aquifer Act. 12 1 The new law set up an authority to regulate
groundwater withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer, and to account for the impacts on surface waters. But the act was declared
unconstitutional and it was 1996 before the state supreme court
upheld the constitutionality of the special regulatory system for the
22
aquifer.'
During the resulting delay in implementation of the act, the
Sierra Club sued again, alleging a taking of endangered species
115. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999).
116. See Houston & Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
117. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (recognizing landowners'
rights in groundwater beneath their land).
118. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
1978) (announcing a prospective rule imposing liability for negligent pumping that causes
subsidence).
119. See Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish That Roared: The EndangeredSpecies Act, State
GroundwaterLaw, and Private PropertyRights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVrL.
L. 845 (1998).
120. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, No. Mo-91-CA-069 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
121. Act of May 30, 1993, ch. 626, § 1.06, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2350, 2355 (amended 1995).
122. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. 1996) (reversing lower court and upholding constitutionality of statute).
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based on the state's failure to manage the aquifer to prevent
deaths, emaciation, and population declines of endangered fish.
The district court enjoined pumping, limited municipal water use,
and expressed doubts about the readiness of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority to manage the aquifer.1 23 The Texas legislature then
mandated that the state agency in charge of revieing applications
for new surface water rights consider the effects of proposed uses
on groundwater and groundwater recharge.'12 4 This scheme still
leaves gaps in conjunctive management It does not address preexisting surface uses that affect groundwater or the effects of
groundwater uses on surface uses. Ultimately, the Texas Supreme
Court considered, in other litigation, whether to apply the doctrine
of reasonable use to all aquifers. In the absence of affirmative legislation, however, the court declined to do so, perpetuating the old
rule of capture in all but the troubled Edwards Aquifer. r
In Nevada the legislature set up a new program directing a local
water authority in the Las Vegas area to establish a groundwater
management program designed to protect long-term supply and
prevent contamination.' 6 In 1999, the state engineer was empowered to revoke groundwater permits temporarily in overdrafted
areas.

1 27

Conjunctive management can cause practical problems for senior users with old, inefficient means of diversion (either surface
diversions or shallow wells) that become ineffective after modem,
efficient wells are installed by junior users. Even if there is enough
water available to satisfy senior rights, seniors may argue that they
should not be required to build efficient diversion works to replace
their old methods of diversion. Idaho has addressed this problem
by enabling special districts to organize so that junior groundwrater
users will develop and pay for mitigation plans to alleviate the im28
pacts on seniors.'
123. Sierra Club v. San Antonio, No. MO-96-C%-097 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1996). The
injunction was eventually vacated by the Court of Appeals in an opinion recounting much
of the history of the litigation. SeeSan Antonio v. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997).
124. Tx. WATER CODE AN,. §11.151 (Vernon 2000).
125. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 SAW.3d 75 (Tex. 1999) (finding that landowner has right under the "rule of capture" to pump the groundwater under
oxwned land without regard to impacts on others; decision whether to make changes in this
principle left to the legislature).
126. 1997 Nev. Stat. 572.
127. 1999 Nev. Star. 534.120 (AB 408).
128. IDAHO CODE § 42-5201 to -5244 (Michie Supp. 2000) (adding ch. 52 to proide
for Ground Water Districts).
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Most other state groundwater legislation during the period
merely dealt with the details of existing groundwater statutes. During an era of growth pressures and enlightened management, one
might have expected states to address the use of aquifers for storage and to establish legal protection for aquifer recharge. Idaho
has taken steps to encourage recharge by recognizing that underground storage is a beneficial use. 29 New Mexico also has legislated to promote aquifer recharge. 130 But other than the efforts in
California to encourage recharge with reclaimed water discussed
earlier,' 3 1 state legislatures have been inactive in this area.
3.

Instream flow.

The most serious and immediately noticeable environmental
impact of water development and use is the depletion of streamflows. By the end of the 1980s, all but the two western states had
created some type of instream flow protection programs to deal
with lost fish and wildlife habitat and diminished recreational opportunities. 3 2 One of the states that lacked an instream flow program, Nebraska, enacted a law permitting instream flow
appropriations during the 1990s and the courts upheld its constitutionality.'3 3 The other, New Mexico, struggled with the issue but
failed to enact a statute, leaving it as the only western state without
13 4
some type of instream flow law.

The existing instream flow protection laws varied in their effectiveness and a few states improved their programs in the 1990s.
Utah broadened its law to allow the Division of Parks, as well as the
129. IDAHO CODE § 42-4201A (Michie 1996) (recognizing the appropriation and storage of water underground to be a beneficial use of water). Some states have administratively provided for storage of recharged waters. E.g., 2 COLO. CODE REcs. § 402-11 (1995)
(allowing evacuated aquifer space to be recharged and used as underground storage reservoirs, upon approval of state engineer).
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5A-1 to -17 (1999) (HB 2162) (establishing a permit program for groundwater storage and recovery). Cf Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §45-2401 to 2472
(West Supp. 1999) (Arizona water banking legislation depends on groundwater storage. See
infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.)

131. See sources cited supra note 110.
132. See DAVID M. GuLnAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTRFAM FLow PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997).
133. In re Application A-16642, 463 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1990) (upholding NEi. REV.
STAT. §§ 46-2, 107 to 46-2, 110).
134. The state engineer has said, however, that he will recognize public agency rights
to flow if a proper application is received. See Tim DeYoung, Instrean Flow Protection In A
Water Market State: Tlw Case of New Mexico, in INSriRAsi FLOW PROTEGnrrON IN THE WEST 33156 (LaATenceJ. MacDonnell et al. eds., 1989).
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Department of Wildlife, to acquire existing appropriations and
convert them to flow rights.' 35 Montana fought for years over
whether to allow experimental leasing of water rights for instream
flows and finally authorized it on five streams., 6 In Washington, a
court held that the state Department of Ecology could condition
groundwater permits on maintenance of streamflows 13 7 Oregon
now provides for unused hydroelectricity rights to be converted to
instream uses. 1'
Most developments during the decade, however, illustrate state
resistance to instream flow protection and some states have retreated from their earlier efforts. Under considerable federal pressure, Idaho enacted legislation in 1991 and 1995 authorizing water
use for flows needed for fish protection. 39 The state had failed to
respond to demands for better protection of endangered salmon
and recognition of Indian treaty rights to water that would sustain
those fish."
One means of making more water available for
salmon habitat in the Snake River was to release water from federal
Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs. There is little doubt that the
government has legal authority to release wrater.14' However, the
state objected, arguing that although the water was not legally committed to or needed by any particular water users, it should not be
released for fishery purposes because it would then no longer be
available for agriculture. The federal government negotiated with
the state to procure its consent to the releases and the Secretary of
the Interior promised-to the extent the releases would interfere
with any water contracts-to "lease" rights from the contractors.
The state legislature finally enacted two temporary laws giving the
federal government "permission" to release the water. Idaho also
135. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1999) (establishing that de Division of Parks,
as well as the Department of Wildlife, can change existing water rights to benefit fish.
recreation, and environmental preservation).
136. MoNr-r. CODE A.\. §§ 85-2-102, 85-2-402, 85-2404 (1999) (allowing experimental

leasing on five streams); Mor. CODE AxxN. § 85-2408 (1999) (increasing opportunities for
temporary changes or leases of existing w%-ater rights for instream flow).
137. Hubbard A%
State, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
138. 1999 Or. Laws 873 (amending OR. RE,. STAT. §§543A.005 to 543A.415).
139. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1501 to 42-1505 (Michie 1996).
140. On Indian treaty rights to water, see Snake River Basin Adjudication, Nez Perce
Consolidated Subcase 03-10022 (Nov. 11, 1999) (granting motions for summary
judgment).
141. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. V. Clark. 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1984), cerL denid 470 U.S. 1083 (1985) (holding that Endangered Species Act obligations
empowered Secretary of the Interior to release water from federal project to protect endangered fishes).
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passed legislation in 1999 to
protect the Payette River from future
14 2
hydropower development.
In Wyoming, the State Supreme Court reversed a special
master's finding that Indian tribes should be able to dedicate water
rights allocated to them in a general stream adjudication to instream flows. 1 43 The court upheld the state engineer's refusal to
enforce tribal instream flow permits that allowed amounts of water
quantified for future tribal agricultural uses to be left in the stream
to maintain the fishery instead of being diverted by non-Indian
irrigators.144
Colorado has one of the oldest and ostensibly most flexible laws
for establishing instream flow rights, 45 but the agency in charge of
administering the law, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, as
well as the legislature and the courts, have curtailed some of the
statute's flexibility and effectiveness. 146 On the other hand, although the legislature declared that only the Board can hold instream flow rights, the state supreme court effectively allowed the
City of Fort Collins to protect instream flows by a creative interpretation of existing law that treats structures like boat chutes that
1 47
nominally "control" flowing water as a "diversion." '
State courts have thwarted most federal attempts to assert instream flow rights under the federal reserved rights doctrine. Colorado courts have rejected claims for water to protect flows for
national monuments and national forests.1 48 The Idaho court ad142. 1999 Idaho Acts Ch. 364 (SB 1151).
143. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
144. Id.
145. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (Supp. 2000).
146. 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 766 (amending CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (Supp.
2000)) (establishing that the state may not acquire conditional rights for instream flows);
CoLo. Rrv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (Supp. 2000) (establishing that the state board must hold
administrative hearing to relinquish instream flow rights; enacted in reaction to Aspen 11i1derness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water ConservationBoard,901 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995) (hold-

ing that power to appropriate a minimum stream-flow imposes a fiduciary duty between
the state board and the people of the state)).
147. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 931 (Colo. 1992) (holding

that appropriation is by a diversion if structures for "use" of water right are built at each
end of stretch of river to be protected). The court found that Fort Collins' channelizing
dam at the beginning of a stretch of stream and boat chute at the end of the same stretch
of stream that it hoped to protect were equivalent to diversion dams. Therefore, the court

found the dams were actually protecting an appropriation by a diversion and were not
appropriating an instream flow.
148. In reApplication for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-85 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Div. 6 March 14, 1985) (regarding Dinosaur National Monument); In re the Amended
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judicating water rights in the Snake River system likewise denied
federal reserved water rights claims for national forests but found
that the purposes of federally designated uilderness areas necessitated a reservation of the unappropriated wraters within and above
streams flowing into those areas. 149 The latter development caused
the state Department of Water Resources to declare a moratorium
on all pending water rights applications, including those that
would not necessarily be affected by the federal claims.15 0 After a
political backlash, the state supreme court reversed itself in
2000.151

4. Public interest.
For many years, virtually all states have required some type of
public interest review of all new appropriations.1 5 2- These laws ostensibly reflected the principle that unappropriated u-ater is a public resource and, therefore, any grant of private rights to use it
should be consistent with the public welfare. 1 3 Application of the
laws was uneven among states, however, and rarely was forceful
enough to protect social and environmental values. Moreover,
most states lacked clear standards for evaluating the public interest
and needed better procedures for public involvement in the process. Some public interest review was no more than a cursory de15
termination by the state engineer. 4
Application of the United States for Reserved Water Rights in the Platte River, No. W-83976 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Div. 6 Feb. 12, 1993) (regarding national forest lands).
149. United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999); In re SRBA. No.
39576, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho, 1999).
150. The Governor publicly declared that "the lives and livelihoods of tens of
thousands of Idahoans could be affected." Given the rather limited opportunities for nter
development upstream of wvildemess areas, this statement and the moratorium appear to
be tactical moves to attract publicity and influence the state supreme court in the State's
appeal of the decision. The political reaction against the decision recognizing federal reserved rights for wilderness areas led to the justice who wvrote the opinion being voted out
of office. Mark Warbis, Power of GOP Maddne, Water Rights Drive Eleelion l7derim Assoel.
ATED PRESS NEwswiarts, BoisE, IDAHO, May 24, 2000.
151. The political reaction against the decision recognizing federal reserved rights
for wilderness areas led to the justice who wrote the opinion being voted out of office. Id.
On rehearing, the court then reached an opposite conclusion. In re SRB.* No. 39576,
2000 WL 1604001 (Idaho, 2000) (Wilderness Act does not create reserved rights for wilderness areas).

152. Douglas Grant, Public Interest Review of Mater Right Alloration and Transfer in the
West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARiz. Sr. LJ. 681 (1987).
153. See supra notes 23-25.
154. Id. See generally Norman KJohnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Sunn'ri ofthe Ea!ution of IWestern 1aterLaw in Response to ChangingiEonomicand PublichiterestDemands 29 N,%T.
PR.ESOURcESJ. 347 (1989).
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Apart from the public interest requirement specific to water allocation, some states require environmental impact reports (EIRs)
on major developments, including water projects and water allocation decisions.-15 5 The environmental assessment process provides
a forum for raising public interest factors in particularly controver15 6
sial cases.
During the 1990s, states gave little attention to improving public interest consideration in water decisions. A few states extended
their public interest requirement to changes and transfers of existing rights, recognizing that limiting such review to new appropriations would undermine the law's purpose because a subsequent
transfer or change of use could occur without considering the public interest.'5 7 Montana has integrated water quality concerns into
water rights decisions by requiring that a proposed change of use
must not adversely affect the water quality of another appropriator
or interfere with the ability of a discharge permit holder to satisfy
effluent limitations in the discharge permit. 158 Oregon now allows
changes of use away from land where water use was originally authorized if it is for the purpose of benefiting endangered species,"' and allows new uses for public benefit without amending
60
basin plans.'
The public trust doctrine is a forceful common law basis for
infusing public interest concerns into water decisions, even without
an express state statutory or constitutional requirement. It became
155. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.030 (West 1998); See CAL. PUB. REs, CODE
§§ 21000-21781 (West 2000); Stempel v. Dept. of Water Resources, 508 P.2d 166 (Wa.
1973) (requiring the Department to investigate potential pollution problems before proceeding with water use plan). See also County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. Rptr.
396, 408 (1977) (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the EIR for a proposal to increase
groundwater extraction by Los Angeles from Inyo County should consider a water conservation program alternative).
156. See Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Mgmt. Dist., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d
1 (1997).
157. IDAHO CODE § 42-211 (Michie 1996); 1993 Mont. Laws 244, 445 (codified as
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-319 (1999)) (requiring changes to conform with
water quality protection goals); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) (changing
of use application subject to public welfare standard though requirement was explicit only
as to new applications); Hardy v. Higginson, 849 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1993) (applying local
public interest standard to application to amend a water permit even though not explicitly
required by statute).
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402 (1999).
159. 1999 Or. Laws 611 (amending OR. REv. STAT. § 537.2.11).
160. 1999 Or. Laws 703 (amending OR. REv. STAT. § 536.295) (allowing new public
uses, including non-consumptive uses, public health and safety, avoiding extreme hardship, and other uses providing public benefits).
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a major topic of discussion in the 1980s after the Mono Lake litigation in which the California Supreme Court held that the public
trust doctrine could be applied to force re-e-aluation of longstanding rights. 6 ' The concept is that the state holds w%-ater in trust for
the people and cannot convey it for private uses without considering the impact on public uses like fish, wildlife, and recreation.
The case that gave life to the doctrine in the field of water allocation was concluded in 1994 by amending Los Angeles' water rights
to maintain instream flows and restore channels in tributaries to
16
Mono Lake.

2

It appears that the ideals in the Mono Lake decision respecting
public values in water will remain a regular part of California water
law, influencing administrative practices and statutory interpretation. For instance, an appellate court subsequently found that the
State Water Resources Control Board must condition use of water
rights on release of sufficient water from a dam licensed by the
Board to restore and maintain fisheries as they existed prior to the
diversion of water. 6 3 Some commentators decried the California
court's mandate to revisit established water rights in the Mono Lake
case as the greatest threat ever to the prior appropriation doctrine
while others hailed it as a godsend necessary to protect a public
resources.' 6Whatever fears there may have been about the doctrine's potential to undermine western water law, the public trust
doctrine as applied to water rights in the Mono Lake case has not
been adopted in other states.
States have done virtually nothing in recent years to improve
public interest review of water decisions. Indeed, some states have
taken steps backward. In Idaho, the Supreme Court pulled back
from its earlier announcement, 165 that the public trust doctrine ap161. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
162. California State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1631 (Sept. 28, 1994)
(amending Los Angeles' water rights to require wuter releases and limits on exports as
necessary to provide instream flows and a channel restoration program to protect fish and
other public trust resources).
163. California Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
164. See various perspectives expressed in Michael C. Blumm & Thea Sch%,arz, Mono
Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western water, 37 Apiz. L RE%. 701 (1995); TimothyJ.
Comy, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Evpanding Public Trust Dactrine, 14
EN'vr.L. L. 617 (1984); RichardJ. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Popcrty and Sorerdgnt in
NaturalResources: Questioningthe Public Trust DordrinA 71 IowA L REA,. 631 (1986); Charles F.
'Wilkinson, Symposium on the Public Trust and the ites of the American 1est: 1Iesterdaq; Today
and Tomorrow, 19 E',vrx. L 425 (1989).
165. SeeKootenai Enitl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho
1983).
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plied to waters of that state. The State Supreme Court did not disavow the doctrine entirely, but held that it does not apply to the
massive Snake River Basin adjudication.16 6 The Idaho legislature
then went farther by prohibiting application of the public trust
doctrine in water appropriations and other matters related to water
rights.

1 67

Colorado is the only state that has implemented no requirement for public interest considerations or protections. Although
the state constitution declares that water is "property of the public,
and [is dedicated] to the use of the people,"16 the Colorado Supreme Court has refused to require water courts, when deciding
whether a large new water right is for a "beneficial use," to accept
or consider evidence of impacts of the proposed water uses on the
environment, local economies, farming, rural communities, or
other public values.16 9
5.

Planning.

Because water law traditionally has encouraged independent
appropriators to make key development decisions, and because
most of the water in the West is tied to uses or physical structures
designed for specific purposes, comprehensive planning is needed
to address changing demands. Indeed, many of the goals for water
reform-efficiency, conjunctive use of groundwater, protecting instream flows, respecting the public interest-seek to reverse condi170
tions created by incentives embedded in the old system.
Subsidies and a policy of free water have created wasteful and environmentally destructive projects and contributed to inefficient
land use. Moreover, water planning has often been a guise for jus71
tifying water development.'
Basic rules in water law also defied the goals of reform. Endowing water users with property rights to all the water they could divert and use rewarded depletion of streams and frustrated
166. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. State of Idaho, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995).
167. IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to -1203 (Michie 1996) (doctrine is solely a limit on
state's alienation of title to beds of navigable waters).
168. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
169. In re Board of County Comm'rs of County of Arapahoe, 891 P.2d 952, 971-74
(Colo.1995).
170. See BATES ET AL., supra note 2, at 128-51.
171. See Getches, supra note 37, at 2. Some state "planning" continues to be development-focused. See 1999 N.D. Laws 535 creating a "comprehensive state wide water development plan" as a means of justifying expenditures of $84.8 million in bond proceeds. See
also 1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws 81, a water planning bill that focuses on water development.
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protection of flowing water and other public values. The rule of
capture as applied to groundwater disconnected pumpers from responsibility for the impacts of their actions.
Many states imposed legal obligations on water suppliers, like
municipalities and districts, to serve new demand, unquestioningly
clearing the way for growth whether or not it was the result of any
conscious plan. 172 Growth was further facilitated by a special exception to the anti-speculation, use-oriented ideal of prior appropriation. State courts and legislators sanctioned the early
acquisition of water rights by growing cities, dubbed by some the
"great and growing cities doctrine," long before actual demand materialized. 7 3 The Colorado Supreme Court recently reiterated its
license for a city to accumulate water rights to meet its future
growth projections by acquiring sufficient water for nearly a fivefold increase in population. 7 4 Idaho, however, has authorized the
Department of Water Resources to decide whether it is necessary to
change water to a municipal use and for how long a municipal
provider can "hold water rights to meet reasonably anticipated future need." 7 5 California has continued its history of subsidizing
the use of imported water for suburban sprawl in the megalopolis
spreading from Los Angeles to San Diego, 76 by using public funds
to create an incentive to transfer agricultural water to the San Di177
ego area.
172. See A. Dan Tarlock, Western WIaterLau, Global Wianning, and Growth Lirnitationm%21
Loy. LA. L REv. 979, 1010-11 (1991).
173. E.g., City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 276
P.2d 992, 997 (Colo. 1954) ("[WIhen appropriations are sought by a growing city, regard
should be given to its reasonably anticipated requirements."); City and County of Denver
v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939); SeeJanis E. Carpenter, Water for GrowingComnunities:
Refining Tradition in the Pacific Northwest; 27 ErNrL. L 127, 128 (1997);J. GregoryJ. Hobbs,
Jr., Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview', 1 U. DL'Fw. %-TERmL RE%,. 1, 15-17 (1997).

174. Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d I (Colo. 1996).
175. IDHmo CODe § 42-202B (Michie 1949). The section also requires a determination
that there will not be a significant effect on agriculture and states that determination of
future need should exclude demand in areas where there are conflicting land use plans.
See Id. § 42-202B(5)-(6).

176. Water supplies for growth of suburban communities in Southern California were
provided by financing delivery systems from the Colorado River iti taxes on already developed areas (i.e., City of Los Angeles). See ROB3ERT Goirum, A LIFE or ITs Ow'x: TIE

Pornrcs AN,'D
PowER OF WATER (1988); Steven P. Erie & Pascalejoassart-Marcelli, Unreadling Southern Calfornia's Water/Growth Nexus: Metropolitan Water DistrictPolicies and Subsidies
for Suburban Development, 1928-1996, 36 C.. W. L REv,. 267 (2000).
177. See Erie &Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 176, at 290. See also infra note 185 and

accompanying text. The arrangement commits statewide tax revenues and may mandate
the growth area from growth-based fees.
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During the 1980s a few states had planning processes that attempted to integrate water supply, quality, and other related issues
such as environmental protection and flood control. 78 Presumably, planning continued during the 1990s in those states, though it
is not revealed by our survey of legislation and court decisions.
The majority of western states had no water planning programs or
limited their planning to supply issues, and they did not make their
planning any more comprehensive during the 1990s. To the extent that states addressed the subject, they dealt with piecemeal
planning to address specific issues such as groundwater, 79 conserInstead of leading to more integrated
vation, 18° or drought.'
water decisions, this approach further divides consideration of related factors and impacts inherent in water development and use.
Water planning remains segregated from land use planning.
Given the serious and widespread concern in the West about population growth and urban sprawl,' 8 2 it is surprising that water planning has not been considered in connection with land use
management efforts.18 3 It seems obvious that land use patterns
drive water demand. For instance, since about half of all current
urban water demand in the West is for watering lawns and gardens,
land use choices can have a dramatic effect on future water demand.'8 4 By forgoing sprawling subdivisions in favor of denser development, population growth can be accommodated with far less
water. Conversely, the type and extent of infrastructure that is
available influences growth and development patterns. Indeed,
there is mounting evidence that water policy can contribute to sub85
urban development and sprawl.1
California alone made some advances in the water planning
process in the 1990s by connecting it to land use planning. Now
178. Kansas, Montana, Oregon, and Washington have the most comprehensive planning processes. See Getches, supra note 37.

179. See supra notes 114, 126-27.
180. See supra notes 97-98, 100, 102-07.
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-3308 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 536.720 (1998); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 16.051(a), 11.1272 (Vernon 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 43.83B.410 (West 1998).
182. See Brad Knickerbocker, USA, What City Dwellers Really Want, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 16, 2000, at 3 (announcing results of opinion polls declaring sprawl and
growth as top concerns of the public); DRIVER, supra note 83.
183. See DRIVER, supra note 83 and accompanying text.
184. See ADViSORY COM,M'N, WATER INTHE WEST, supra note 33, at 2-27.
185. See Erie &Joassart-Marcelli, supra note 176 (showing the correlation of suburban
growth in Southern California with availability of subsidized water supplies).
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factors such as water conservation, evaluation of supply, and pollution control are required elements of land use plans. 86 In 1995, it
passed a law requiring cities to determine that there is a firm water
supply before approving major new developments. 87 This determination does not necessarily connect wvith any state or regional
land use or water plans or the plans of any neighboring municipality. The courts have shown some willingness to enforce the California Environmental Quality Act requirement that municipalities
produce an environmental impact report evaluating the effects of
growth in water demand, including the impacts on an area from
which water would be exported."8
States have not seized opportunities to soften or head off the
federal regulatory presence by instituting strong land use planning
and control programs. Federal air and water pollution controls,
solid waste regulation, wetlands protection, and endangered species preservation laws all affect the wkay land is used. If the states
sought to ameliorate impacts of land use decisions on wvater quality, wetlands, and fish and wildlife habitat by considering these impacts in planning, and by permitting development and growth,
there would be less need for federal regulation.
The failure of states to relate growth management to wrater
planning is commensurate with the paucity of state-level land use
planning and management programs. Only Oregon and Hawaii
have assumed any significant level of statewide growth management land use controls. 8 9 They have reasonably effective controls
on land use, although even they do not integrate water resource
planning in the state-mandated planning responsibilities. Most
states have deferred to local governments in land use regulation,
resulting in widespread public dissatisfaction with the lack of effective, coordinated planning. The appealing assumption that local
communities are in the best position to determine and regulate
land use patterns may be valid for relatively isolated and slow-growing municipalities. But the ideal gives way when intense economic
186. C L- GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 2000).
187. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10914 (West 2000).

188. See Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 55 Cal Rptr .2d
625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting subdivision plan for failure to consider long-term water
supply availability).
189. See DAVID L C raFs, ROBERT H. FRmuci & THO.As E. Ronrmm, Cses .vD
MATEaIALs oN LAxD USE 610 (3d ed. 1999); H-w. RE%. ST.AT. § 205-1 to -18 (1998); On. RE%.
STAT. § 197.005-197.860 (1998). Outside the West, Vermont has one of the strongest state
land use planning programs. See 10 VT. STAT. Av,. §§6001-6104 (2000); RICI, RD 0.
BROOKS, TowARD COMMUNriy SurSiN.-iurn Vrh.tod-r's Acr 250 (1997).
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pressure comes to bear on local governments that lack the resources or will to enact and enforce effective plans, and does not
work in any event if some municipalities in a region have the will
and foresight to control growth and neighboring municipalities do
not. Thus, without statewide or regional programs, it is unlikely
that there will be effective land use planning and growth management, let alone a framework for integrating water planning.
6.

Transfers and marketing.

Free transferability of water rights facilitates movement of water
to higher valued economic uses and promotes greater efficiency
and conservation. These are goals touted by economists and water
reformers with which western states apparently agree in principle.
One of the few new laws that promotes water marketing is a California statute to encourage efficient transfers. l 90 However, most
state activity in the area of transfers during the decade has tended
to restrict rather than encourage freer water markets as proposed
in the 1980s. 19 1

States are subject to political pressure to control transfers between basins, from out of state, and from agricultural to urban
uses, and it is reasonable to expect them to attempt to ameliorate
adverse effects of transfers. States could respond with legislation
requiring analysis and mitigation of environmental impacts and inequities caused by transfers. 192 But rather than developing programs that would enable beneficial transfers, nearly all recent
legislation has simply added procedural barriers that impede or increase the cost of transfers. Colorado, however, has focused on the
impacts of transfers out of agricultural uses by requiring revegetation when farmland has dried up. 193 Oregon and Kansas added
requirements for major appropriations by subjecting them to a special level of review.' 94 Oregon, Nevada and Texas placed controls
on transbasin diversions.191 Finally, six states enacted measures at190. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1584 (West) (amending CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1707,

1726, 1727, 1728, 1732, and adding §§ 1014-1017).
19]. But see MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402 (1999) (removing legislative approval requirement for changes in in-state use of large appropriations).
192. See Charles W. Howe, ProtectingPublic Values in a Water Market Setting Water Markets to IncreaseEfficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 357, 368-72 (2000).
193. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-305(4.5), 37-92-103(10.4) (Supp. 2000).
194. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.810 (1989) (appropriations greater than 50cfs subject to
legislative approval); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1501 to -1506 (1989) (special procedures apply to transfers greater than 2000 AF/year or greater than 35 miles).
195. NEv. REv. STAT. § 534.120 (Supp. 1999) (groundwater); NEv. Rhv. STAr.
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tempting to control interstate transfers without running afoul of
dormant commerce clause limitations.

96

The only significant state effort to promote intrastate transfers
was based on subsidy, not liberalization of the market. Under pres-

sure to reduce dependence on water imported from the Colorado
River, the California legislature appropriated $235 million in 1998
to facilitate an agricultural to urban transfer. 9 This effort would
move water from the Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego
through existing facilities of the Metropolitan Water District. Apparently, the transfer of presently wasted, low value water to high
value uses needed political, more than economic impetus; as of
this writing the project still has not been implemented.
One development that ostensibly encouraged water marketing
among states on the Colorado River was the creation of the Arizona Water Banking Authority in 1996.11 Upon further examination, however, it appears less progressive. The law was motivated by
Arizona's desire to capture presently unneeded Colorado River
water to which it is legally entitled so that California would not be
able to continue to use surplus water to meet demands in excess of
its legal entitlements. Rather than being motivated by market
forces, the "banking" proposal required imposing taxes to subsidize the expensive pumping and transport of water from the river
so that it could be stored underground in Arizona.' 99 The logic is
§§ 533.345, 533.530 (1995) (surface water); O. RE%. STAT. §§ 537.801, 537.803, 537.805,
537.809,537.830 (1989); T-x. WATER CODE A,%,,. § 11.085 (Vernon 1997) (requiring assessment of impacts and alternatives).
196. AiAsKA, STAT. § 46.15.035 (ichie 1998) (also fee for export); Asuz. R-v. STArT.
AN,4. §§ 45-291 to -294 (West 1994) (requiring Director of Water Resources to consider
effects on water conservation, availability of alternative sources, current water supply and
future demands); IDAHO CODE § 42-401 (Michie 1996) (standards for exports generally
similar to requirements for in-state appropriations); NEv. RE%. Sr,T. §533.520 (1991) (similar to Idaho statute); O, -. ST.AT. A,,. tit. 82, § 1085.2(2) (West 1990) (requiring legislative approval); UTAH CODE A.,T,.§§ 73-3a-101 to -109 (Supp. 1999) (enabling exports on
conditions designed to protect state interests).
197. California had for years been using much more than its legal allocation of ,ater
from the Colorado River, and other states in the Colorado River Basin insisted on a reduction of use. See Getches, supra note 51, at 611. By using less Colorado River water in
agriculture it could theoretically satisfy demand and reduce imports. S.B. 1765, 1997-98
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (codified as amended at Cu. WATER CODE § 12,560-65 (West 2000)).
This reportedly would be the largest water transfer agreement in the history of the United
States. See California: The Metropolitan Waler District of Soulhern California Endors Coorado
River Water TransferAgreement Between San Diego CountIWater Aulhorib and Imperial Irrigation
Distric 2 W. WATER L & POL'Y REP. 191 (1998).
198. ARu. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §45-2401 to -2402 (West 1994). See also Aruz. RE%. STrT.
§§45-291 to 294 (Supp. 1999) (enabling interstate marketing of water).
199. See Getches, supranote 51, at 610-15.
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that in dry years Arizona can rely on this stored groundwater and
market the right to use the quantity to which it is entitled directly
from the river to Nevada and possibly California. Acceptance by
the Colorado River basin states of the scheme nevertheless marks a
significant departure from their former unyielding opposition to
20 0
interstate water marketing.
C.

Water Reform Moves Outside-the-Box

The most important innovations in water policy in the 1990s
have occurred in response to federal pressure and local initiatives,
and almost entirely outside the legislatures and courts of the western states. Instead of being produced within the traditional western water institutional framework, changes were generated
"outside-the-box." These approaches, more than official state programs, carry forward the kinds of reform-minded ideas that characterized the rhetoric of western governors in the 1980s. Broad
segments of the public have gotten involved in solving water
problems and have addressed them with attention to their interrelationships with other issues. They have employed solutions that
promote more efficient use, market mechanisms, and conjunctive
use. Although they are usually ad hoc responses to particular
problems, many of these efforts are better examples of a comprehensive approach to planning than state-sponsored water
planning.
Although sweeping state institutional reforms are theoretically
possible, the experience of the recent past suggests that the most
promising advances in the foreseeable future will continue to be ad
hoc, outside-the-box, responses to problems arising in specific geographic areas. Unless states can muster the will to embrace reform
when the opportunities arise, the federal government along with
these local groups will continue to foment constructive change.
1. Macro-watershed initiatives.
In the watersheds of several major rivers, place-specific problem
solving efforts are being conducted by representatives of diverse
200. The Secretary of the Interior has proposed rules to facilitate the Arizona plan.
See Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 64 Fed. Reg. 68373 (1999). These rules are far
more limited than ones allowing interstate water marketing that were proposed by the
Department of the Interior several years earlier. A similar, but more comprehensive approach to banking and marketing had also been proposed earlier by California, but it met
hostile opposition from Arizona and the other basin states. See Getches, supra note 51, at
610.
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interests. Although some of these efforts have been supported by
state legislation, they generally operate outside traditional water institutions as particularized responses to issues that could not or
were not being addressed successfully by existing institutions. Typically, they have tackled a wide range of issues and assembled a diverse group of parties to participate in seeking solutions.
The most notable macro-watershed effort is "CALFED." In this
effort, representatives of agricultural, business, environmental, and
urban concerns, along with representatives of sixteen state and federal agencies, 20 1 are cooperatively trying to solve the problems
growing out of the so-called Bay-Delta dispute in California. - 2
Originally the Bay-Delta matter appeared to be a problem of controlling water quality in the delta of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers at San Francisco Bay. However, it was soon found to
implicate water use and protection throughout the state of California. Environmental and supply problems and operations of water
diversion facilities were causing serious, ongoing violations of the
federal Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act. State institutions were not equipped to deal comprehensively with the related
problems of water quality, watershed protection, ecosystem restoration, water use efficiency, water transfers, instream flow maintenance, flood control, and managing water storage and conveyance
facilities. This panoply of issues, formerly addressed in a piecemeal
fashion by state legislation, agencies, and courts, became
CALFED's portfolio. The participants are now engaged in what
amounts to comprehensive statewide water planning to ensure
more reliable water supplies, new management practices to improve water quality for the environment, cities, and farms, and
ecosystem restoration efforts, including removal of small dams.
Elsewhere, the operations of Glen Canyon Dam, on the Colorado River, are now subject to ongoing review by an "adaptive management work group."2 0 3 A group of states, Indian tribes, power
purchasers, recreational users, federal agencies, and environmen201. See Ai_,imcAN BAR AssocixnON, & THE Nxno-,LL F' ERav Em'.IRO.NmEw'r Lx"v &
PoLucy I1NsTuTE, UxnIEr" OF TuLsk CoLLEcE OF Lw, E-,%iRoN~gr, ENERn'; ,xiD Pi.
souRcEs Lkw 1999: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 166 (2000).

202. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Ba-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainab'ilil, 67 U.
L REv. 341 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism WISthout Preenption:A Case Studty in
Bioregionalism, 27 PAc. LJ. 1629 (1996).
203. See Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriersto the Restoration of Aquatic S.ysters and the
UtilizationofAdaptiveManagemen4 23 VT. L RL. 177, 187 (1998); Getches, supra note 51, at
609.
COLO.
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tal organizations is charged with monitoring the effects of policies
and plans for operating Glen Canyon Dam. In the past, release of
water from the dam, primarily for power generation, has caused
serious environmental and social problems. The group now evaluates such issues as the consequences of dam operations for Grand
Canyon National Park, and goals such as fulfilling recreational and
environmental purposes and recovery of endangered fish species.
It then recommends changes in the dam's operating regime to
meet various management objectives consistent with the public interest, such as proposing releases necessary to maintain flows required for ecosystem restoration and recreation.
Another macro-watershed effort is underway on the Platte
River. After twenty years of conflict over the effects of water development projects on endangered species in the central Platte River,
the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming have signed a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of the Interior to implement a joint program of restoration and improved
management of the river. Environmental groups as well as water
users and governments at all levels participate in the program.
The agreement addresses endangered species concerns and various collateral issues and is expected to result in delivery of the
4
flows that are needed for habitats of several species.

20

In the case of the Truckee River-Pyramid Lake issue in Nevada,
the results of long and complex negotiations among diverse interests were codified in federal legislation. 20 - The legislation resolved

many issues, ranging from tribal water rights to interstate allocation of waters between California and Nevada. Important wildlife
issues were addressed, including water rights to benefit the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge and implementation of recovery plans
for the Pyramid Lake's imperiled cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat
trout. The act also called for negotiation among all the interested
parties of an operating agreement for federal facilities on the
Truckee River which, supplies Pyramid Lake. The resulting agreement led to increased efficiencies for the Newlands Reclamation
Project that had sapped the river of water needed to maintain the
level of the lake and sustain its fishery.
204. See J. David Aiken, Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water
Rights: The Platte River Cooperative Agreement, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 119, 144
(1999).
205. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-618, 104 Stat. 3289; A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement
Regimes: The Case of the Truckee-Carson Settlement, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 674 (1999).

2001]

METAMORPHOSIS OF WIESTERN WATER POLICY

45

Finally, representatives from Arizona, California, and Nevada
have come together with various wN-ater and power agencies to form
a regional partnership to develop the Lower Colorado River Basin

Multi-Species Conservation Program.2 -0 6 It is intended to comply

with the Endangered Species Act by conserving endangered species and their critical habitat in the 100-year floodplain of the Colorado River within the United States. In addition, it will facilitate
further development of Colorado River wrater. Because species that
become endangered in the future may lie in the path of development, the program will attempt to conserve eighty-eight, mostly
non-listed, species in the lower Colorado River basin. This will allow present development to proceed as part of an approved habitat
conservation plan under provisions of the ESA that allow some incidental harm to endangered species if the plan can provide overall benefits to habitat that otherwise might not be attained. 0 7
2. Local watersled efforts.
In addition to macro-watershed efforts, there are hundreds of
local efforts that involve people in neighborhoods, watersheds, and
communities in solving water and other resource problems that affect them. As with the macro-watershed efforts, the approach they
follow is far different from the traditional state agency approach to
water problems. Instead of looking narrowly at specific projects
and limited considerations to address particular issues or
problems, these efforts attempt to include as many issues and interests as possible.
In these watershed groups, people and entities representing varied interests may be drawn together by different concerns emanating from use of a common resource. 'When a river runs through a
town or community, for instance, some residents' concerns about
pollution caused by an upstream mine may motivate them to seek
solutions to the problem, while others may be concerned because
an endangered species issue inhibits development. By coming together, disparate interests-from a mine owner to local citizens,
business owners to environmentalists, and scientists to school children-become involved in developing multi-faceted solutions,
206. See Robert Wigington & Dale Pontius, Toward Rang-WIIde Integration of Re1&zov
Implementation Programfor tle Endangeed Fusles of the ColoradoRher,in TnE COLORADO Rxva.
WORKSHOP: ISSUES, IDEAS, AND DIRECTIONS 63 (1996).
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1994). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 63854 (1996); Di.u-,AmEr
oF THE IN REIOR, HABITAT CONSERVATION PL-LNINING H-VDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP
HA \ DBOOrI].
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often employing a holistic, or systems approach.2 0 8
The Animas River Stakeholder Group is typical of collaborative
problem solving at the watershed level. Local residents, who
shared a common concern for the quality of the Animas River in
southern Colorado, convened after water quality studies by the
state Department of Health confirmed contamination of the river
by cadmium, lead, and other metals leaching from several abandoned mines.20 9 Encouraged by a federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) policy favoring watershed-based solutions to
water quality problems, the state agency hired a facilitator and
helped obtain a United States Department of Energy grant to set
up the stakeholder group. Participants were attracted to the group
for reasons ranging from an altruistic desire to restore the fishery
to attempts to avoid Superfund listing and liability. Members included two towns, a county, three state agencies, two federal agencies, a tribe, landowners, mining companies, environmental
activists, and other concerned citizens. The group has undertaken
monitoring, identification of pollution hot spots, prioritizing
sources of contamination, and planning solutions consistent with a
comprehensive view of the public interest.210
The Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado School of Law has been studying local watershed groups and
has published a collection of profiles of many of them.2 1' These

groups typically are "grass-roots" efforts, created and operated
from the ground up. Although Oregon 12 and Washington, 13
have passed enabling legislation to encourage and provide funding
208. See generally MAcDONNELL, supra note 34, at 280-86; William E. Taylor & Mark
Gerath, The Watershed Protection Approach: Is the Promise About to be Realized? 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 16 (1996).

209. For a study of the Animas River Stakeholders Group, see Sean T. McAllister, The
Confluence of a River and a Community: An Experiment with Community-Based Watershed Management in Southwestern Colorado, 3 U. DEN. WATER L. REv. 287, 314-34 (2000). See generally
DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE WATERSHED LEVEL: AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN THE EMERGING ERA OF COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MAN.
AGEMENT 12-16

(1997).

210.

KENNEY, supra note 209.

211.

See NATURAL RESOURCE LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, THE NEW WATER.
BooK: A DIRECTORY AND REVIEW OF WATERSHED INITIATIVES IN THE WESTERN

SHED SOURCE

(2000).
212. Watershed Management Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 541.384 (1998) (requiring Water
Resources Department to cooperate with other state and federal agencies, local watershed
councils, non-profits and citizen's groups to administer watershed management programs); 1995 Or. Laws 404, §4 (allocating funds from state lottery revenue to Governor's
Watershed Enhancement Board).
UNITED STATES

213.

1998 Wash. Laws 247 (codified at

'WASH.

REV. CODE ANN. § 90.82.060 (West
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to such groups, most watershed groups in the West operate
outside-the-box of traditional state institutions.
3.

Dam removaL

For many years, dam-building was a centerpiece of water policy
and was encouraged by water law. Breeching or tearing down
dams therefore is a revolutionary and controversial idea that surely
must be considered an outside-the-box approach. Some experts
have urged a less drastic measure that alters the way dams are operated from their originally authorized purposes. Indeed, re-operation of major dams and facilities, especially Bureau of Reclamation
projects, to fulfill new environmental purposes and satisfy emerging demands on water resources has considerable potential for
ameliorating the adverse effects of water development. 214 But outright removal of some dams to restore natural flows appears to be
the most appropriate action in many cases.
During relicensing proceedings several years ago, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) began considering removal, or "decommissioning," of antiquated dams that were doing
little good and much harm.

15

The Edwards Dam on the Kenne-

bec River in Maine was ordered to be removed to restore Atlantic
salmon runs that had been impeded for almost 200 years.2'1 6 The
Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams, which have blocked salmon
spawning on the Elwha River in Washington, are likely to be taken
out in the near future. 1 7 American Rivers has reported that at
least ninety-seven dams have been removed across the country as of
April 1999.218 The dam removal movement seems to be directly
linked to heightened public participation in solving water
problems unencumbered by the "box" of traditional institutions
and a narrow class of decision makers. 1 9
Surprisingly, there is also serious discussion of removing some
of the nation's biggest dams. A study is undenvay assessing the
1998)) (Watershed-planning act providing for local governments, Indian tribes, and local
citizens to prepare and adopt watershed plans through a consensus process).
214. See MacDonnell, supra note 55.
215. Klein, supra note 47, at 694.
216. I& at 712-13.
217. SeeA New Erafor Hydropower,A-.- R sRs, Winter 1998, at 3. See aLsoJohn McPhee,
Farewell to the Nineteenth Centuy, THE NEw YoRKER, Sept. 27, 1999, at 44.
218. AMERICAN RVTRS Er A.., DA.4sREvto\sA. Succzss STORIES: REsTowG RiwErs
THROUGH SELECrIE RF-OVAL OF DA.ts THiAT

DON'T NLA-E SENSE (1999).

219. See Klein, supra note 47 (linking dam removal to de democratization of environmental decision making).
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consequences of breeching four major dams on the Snake River.220
The plan would remove impediments to fish passage, thereby improving the possibility of fulfilling Indian treaty fishing and water
rights. At least one Northwest governor has spoken in support of
the controversial plan.22 '
There are also proposals for removal of the Glen Canyon
Dam.222 The idea was first raised casually at a Sierra Club meeting.
Eventually, though, several members of Congress called hearings
on the idea, which elevated public attention and the seriousness of
the proposal. Since then, the public has become more intrigued
and the proposal remains viable at least as a vehicle for studying
the impacts of the dam's operations.223
4.

General stream adjudications.

At least four states have initiated general stream adjudications
to determine water rights of users throughout an entire river basin.
This is arguably not truly an outside-the-box approach, inasmuch
as stream adjudications are created by state legislative action and
occur in state courts or agencies. Nor is the idea of bringing a
single lawsuit to determine all rights within an entire river system
new. But there has been a recent resurgence in using complex,
multi-party litigation to determine water rights. Creating such special procedures and rules to govern a proceeding before a special
purpose court, master, or agency tends to remove policy making
for entire watersheds from ordinary processes for several years
while rights are determined. At least procedurally, then, general
220. Michael. C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The
Biological, Economic, and Legal Casefor Breachingthe Lower Snake River Dams, LoweringJohn Day
Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1004 (1998).
221. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon's Governor Favors Breaching 4 Major Dams, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2000, at A9.

222. See Steven W. Carothers & Dorothy A. House, DecommissioningGlen Canyon Dam:
The Key to Colorado River Ecosystem Restoration and Recovery of EndangeredSpecies? 42 ARIz. L.
REv. 215 (2000); Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy?
19 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 121 (2000); David L. Wegner, Looking Toward the Future: The Time Has
Come to Restore Glen Canyon, 42 ARIuz. L. REv. 239 (2000); Patrick Graham, Idea of Draining
Lake Makes Waves: (A Movement to Empty Lake Powell is Gaining Ground, Albeit Slowly, Despite
Harsh Effects), PORTLAND OREGONIAN, March 7, 1999, at A-21.

223. See Oversight Hearing on the Sierra Club's Proposalto Drain Lake Powell or Reduce its
Water Storage Capability: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on National Parks and Public Lands, and
Water and Power Resources of the House of Representatives, 105th Cong. (1997); Ed Marston,
Sierra Club Moves to Fortify its "DrainLake Powell" Campaign, HIGH CoUTrrY NEWs, Oct. 15,
1997, at 5.
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stream adjudications may correctly be viewed as an outside-the-box
approach.
Basin-wide adjudications can be massive in scope. In Idaho, the
Snake River basin adjudication involves approximately 185,000
claims and has been in active litigation since 1987. - The Gila
River adjudication in Arizona began in 1974 and seeks to resolve
In Oregon, the Department of
the claims of 24,000 water users. -'
Water Resources began an adjudication process in 1990, joining
25,000 claimants to determine federal and pre-1909 uvater rights in
the Klamath Basin.2 2 6 Washington has been adjudicating rights in
the Yakima River basin since 1977, with as many as 40,000 water
users' interests at stake.2 27
Revisiting water rights and claims in the context of entire iwtersheds and modern values can alter long-standing expectations,
which in turn can result in political reactions. If general stream
adjudications view all the claims in a basin, senior and junior, with
the same level of concern for equity and efficiency, rights to older,
typically largei and less efficient uses may be imperiled. Because
changes like this can disrupt settled expectations of the parties,
state legislatures responded by amending the procedures and altering the substantive rules applied by the courts to determine water
rights of the parties. For example, in Idaho, newer, more efficient
groundwater uses were in competition with senior, inefficient surface water uses. When the court in the Snake River basin adjudication applied a standard of reasonable efficiency it disadvantaged
some of the most senior users whose uses depended on old surface
diversion works. Consequently, the state legislature tried to change
the rules of decision after the special master and court had ruled in
favor of the junior users.2 28
Similarly, the Arizona legislature attempted to revise the rules
224. SeeJohn E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications:Approaches and Alternatitve, 42
Rocxy Mrx. Mn. L Iesr. 22-1, 22-39 (1996).
225. Id. at 22-37.
226. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762 (1994); see also Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: ProtectingEstablished Water Uses in the Pacific Northw-st, Despite the Rules
ofPriorAppropriation,28 ENvr. L 881, 902 (1998).
227. See Thorson, supra note 224, at 22-40 to 2241.
228. Idaho v. United States, 912 P.2d 614 (1995) (overturning in part Act of April 12,
1994, chs. 454-55, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laus 1443-91) (codified at ID.uto CODE 42-1401 to 1428 (Supp. 1994)). See also Robert E. Bakes, The Snake River Basin Adjudication... From the
Beginningto the Present, 38 Advocate (Idaho) 10 (1995); A. Lynn Krogh, Water Right Adjudications in the Western States: Procedures, Constitutionali),Problens and Solution.%30 L%.%D &
WATER L REv. 9, 39 (1995).
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for findings of forfeiture and abandonment, adverse possession,
and the filing requirements for water rights applications that were
established for the Gila River adjudication. Challenges by the
United States and Indian tribes led to striking down these revisions
to the enabling legislation for the adjudication. 229 The legislature
intended for the new rules to apply retroactively, in order to benefit senior users in the adjudication. For instance, the amendments
would have eliminated the need for seniors to pursue more efficient alternative to their surface diversions. But the court found
that this change would affect the vested rights of the competing
junior users, violating due process guarantees under the state
constitution.23 °
It appears that legislatures have tried, though with limited success, to rein in the courts in general stream adjudications by changing their mandates and the rules under which they operate when
the courts have moved away from traditional approaches or risked
upsetting settled expectations. The unwillingness of state legislatures to tolerate independence of these special purpose courts illustrates the necessity to move outside conventional state
institutions to find effective solutions to modern water problems.
5.

Indian water rights settlements.

One of the areas targeted for reform in the 1980s was the handling of Indian water rights claims. At the time, the federal government had begun in earnest several efforts to negotiate resolutions
of tribal claims, and the states were generally cooperating.' 1 Unlike many of the other areas discussed, federal leadership faltered
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the model of convening all the affected
parties and negotiating a practical resolution to water problems illustrates again the necessity of removing problems from conventional institutions to find effective solutions.
Under venerable Supreme Court precedent, Indian tribes and
the United States hold impliedly reserved rights to water in sufficient quantities to fulfill the purposes of their reservations.2 3 2
229. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) (striking
down over twenty attempted legislative alterations of general water law to be applied in the
stream adjudication, H.B. 2276 based on Constitution and McCarran Amendment); see also
Thorson, supra note 224, at 22-37.
230. Id.
231. See John E. Thorson, Proceedings of the Symposium on Settlement of Indian Water
Rights Claims, 22 ENv-r.. L. 1009 (1990).
232. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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These rights are superior to the rights of most water users, who
depend on rights to use water under state prior appropriation laws
because they date from the time a federal or Indian reservation was
established rather than from when the water was first put to use.
Unless they are specifically quantified for particular uses, reserved
rights can cast a cloud of uncertainty over later, state-created

rights.
The desire to quantify federal and Indian reserved water rights
in order to provide greater certainty for non-Indian water users w-as
the motivation for most states to commence general stream adjudications. The federal government and Indian tribes, however, tried
to keep actions to quantify reserved water rights for federal and
Indian lands out of state courts by arguing that the McCarran
Amendment, 3 a federal law consenting to the adjudication of federal water rights claims in state courts, did not apply to reserved
rights. Although the legislation does not mention reserved rights,
the courts uniformly ruled that Congress intended to include these
rights under the McCarran Amendment's consent to suit.2- 4 The
states then seized the opportunity to quantify federal and Indian
reserved rights in their own courts and several western states initiated some type of judicial or quasi-administrative proceeding for
this purpose."3 5
Proving reserved rights claims requires the court to quantify future needs, not simply present usage. In the case of a reservation
set aside for agricultural purposes, the court must determine the
number of practicably irrigable acres on the resernation and then
set the amount of water needed to irrigate all of those lands.2 6 In
the only reserved rights case that has been full), adjudicated under
the McCarran Amendment, quantification of water rights under
the practicably irrigable acreage proved enormously expensive and
time consuming. 237 Some experts had long urged that such claims
233. 43 U.S.C. §666 (1994).
234. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. V.United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
235. The United States and Kiamath Tribe unsuccessfully challenged application of
the McCarran Amendment to quasi-administrative proceedings in UnitdStats t.Oregon, 44
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), cerL denk, 516 U.S. 943 (1995).
236. SeeArizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

237. In re General Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo.), affd sub nom., Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
See also Teno Roncalio, The BigHorns of a Dilemma, in INoL, WEar I Tm NEW WEsT 209,
211 (Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds., 1993).
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should be settled, rather than litigated, 238 and states as well as the
federal government embraced the idea. 239 The Indian water settlement process stagnated, however, following a flurry of activity in
the 1980s, when a dozen or more settlements were concluded. The
Clinton Administration concluded no settlements in its first term,
except one that was in the works when it came into office in
1993.240 Eventually, an agreement was reached for a settlement on
the Warms Springs Reservation.2 4 1 Congress approved a settlement on the Rocky Boy's Reservation in the closing days of 1999,242
and for the Shivwits Paiute in 2000.243
D.

Forcesfor Change: FederalRegulation and Local Action

The wave of good intentions for state water policy reforms that
swept us into the 1990s yielded only limited progress. Decisions on
major water development proposals now tend to include a more
diverse group of interests than in the past and to consider explicitly
environmental, fish and wildlife, social and economic impacts. In
addition to having a voice in development decisions, local groups
are also finding creative solutions to problems caused by past
decisions.
These changes, however, have not resulted from systemic reforms in state law or policy. In fact, state legislative and judicial
records for the last decade show, with the possible exception of
California, a remarkable lack of reform at the state level. Some
interesting efforts are scattered among the western states, but even
238. See Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water v. PaperRights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated
Settlements and TheirEffects, 11 STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 151 (1992); Joseph R. Membrino, A Federal
Perspective, in INDIAN WATER IN THE NEW WEsr 57,59 (Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds., 1993).
239. See Thorson, supra note 231, at 1009.
240. E.g., Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1994, Pub, L.
No. 103-434, 108 Stat. 4526 (1994); States continued to ratify settlements that had been
essentially concluded before the Clinton Administration. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §85-20301 (1999) (ratifying Northern Cheyenne-Montana Compact). The Montana Legislature
also ratified a compact with the Crow tribe quantifying the tribe's water rights. MONT.
CODE ANN § 85-20-901 (1999).
241. See Jonathan Brinckman, Water Rights Pact Comes Peacefully, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 18, 1997, at E07.
242. Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian Reserved Water
Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-163, 113

Stat. 1778. See Barbara A. Cosens, The 1997 Water Rights Settlement Between the State of Montana and the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation:The Role of Community and of the
Trustee, 16 UCLAJ. ENVL. L. & POL'y 255, 257 (1997-98).

243. Shivwits Band of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Water Rights Settlement Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-263, 114 Stat. 737.
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if all of them were concentrated in a single state, the record would
fall short of the needs for reform that were identified in the 1980s.
Because the states failed to take the initiative in reshaping water
policy, most water policy reforms of the 1990s occurred outside established state institutions. An examination of the outside-the-box
efforts that have advanced water policy reveals that these reforms
have been driven mostly by two interrelated forces: increased activity within federal regulatory programs, and the growth of watershed or other place-specific citizen efforts.
1.

The influence offederal regulation.

Today, the two most powerful legal influences on water use and
development are the Endangered Species Act (ESA)2 44 and section
404 of the Clean Water Act.2 45 The ESA requires all officials who
grant federal permits or approvals to assure that the proposed actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any species
listed by the US Fish and Wildlife Service as threatened or endangered. 2 1 Because the construction, alteration, or operation of virtually every major water facility, whether public or private, requires
some kind of federal permit, and much of the undeveloped water
in the West affects sensitive habitat, the ESA is often implicated.
Even non-federal actions that result in habitat modification on private lands can invoke Section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits "taking" endangered species. -a
Because the ESA can effectively block new development and
uses of water, parties seeking practical solutions that comply with
the ESA have created many of the "voluntary" collaborative
processes at the macro and local watershed levels.2 48 The Fish and
Wildlife Service can propose "reasonable and prudent alternatives"
that allow the federal government to approve actions that do some
harm to endangered species..2 49 The agencies can also approve
habitat conservation plans (HCPs) that allow some incidental taking of endangered species by private parties in exchange for pro244. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
245. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
246. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(2).

247. K-g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687 (1995).
248. Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organwalion and the Rtesntiaringof
Institutionsfor Ecosystn Managenent 25 EcoLoY" LQ. 692, 697 (1999).
249. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999).
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viding other substantial environmental benefits. 2 50 Local groups
are attractive because they provide a forum to develop more flexible plans than the alternatives sometimes offered by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and HCPs can be designed to satisfy diverse interests. By including parties who might otherwise
raise legal objections, the processes of developing reasonable and
prudent alternatives or a habitat conservation plan can also make
the action less susceptible to challenge.
Several examples illustrate how fear of ESA enforcement has
motivated outside-the-box approaches to solving western water
problems. Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming were brought to the
table on the Platte River over endangered species issues because
the central Platte is habitat for whooping cranes and other endangered species.25 1 In the Snake and Columbia Rivers, the listing of
seven species of salmon as threatened or endangered2 5 2 provided a
catalyst for major changes in water management and hydropower
generation throughout the Northwest. Local watershed groups are
contributing to the search for solutions to the complex problems
of fisheries and hydropower facilities. 25 3 The Bay-Delta problems
that led to the CALFED process arose under the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act.25 4 That, in turn, is causing California to rethink almost every aspect of water use statewide.
Colorado River management is heavily influenced by the need to
protect endangered species of fish. Nearly every stretch of the
river has been designated as critical habitat for one or more species
of endangered fishes,255 limiting the scope and type of water use
and the extent of power generation on the river and through the
seven states that share the river.25 6
Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act also places signifi250. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a) (1994); see also HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 207; Frederico
M. Cheever, An Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With a Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62 U. COLO. L.
REv. 109, 169 (1991).
251. J. David Aiken, BalancingEndangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water Rights:
The Platte River CooperativeAgreement, 3 GREAT PLANS NAT. RESOURCES J. 119 (1999).
252. See generally, THE NORTHWEST SAI.ION CRIsIs: A DOCUmENTARY HIs-rov (Joseph
Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996).
253. See Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act:
Lessons From the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REv. 519 (1999).
254. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability,67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 341, 356 (1996).
255. James H. Bolin,Jr., Of Razorbacks and Reservoirs: The EndangeredSpecies Act's Protection of Endangered Colorado River Basin Fish, 11 PACE ENvrL. L. REv. 35 (1993).

256. See Wigington & Pontius, supra note 206.
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cant limitations on water development. The law requires a permit
for dredging and filling waters of the United States, and is applied
by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to ensure protection of adjacent wetlands. 7 The Corps accordingly requires a permit for placing fill material, such as earth or concrete,
in a stream or a wetland in the process of building a dam.25 Thus,
the permitting process can be used to reshape and place conditions on the construction of a new dam, or even to prevent its
construction.
The courts have validated the role of the Corps and of the EPA,
which can veto permits granted by the Corps," 9 in applying section
404 to deny permits for new dams and water facilities.'-' O For example, the EPA vetoed a permit for the proposed Two Forks Dam in
Colorado after it was disclosed that the project would have substantial environmental impacts, including flooding miles of an extraordinary trout stream, eliminating elk habitat, and degrading
water quality.26 ' The EPA identified less harmful alternatives that
were not considered by the dam's proponent, the City of Denver,
including water conservation, groundwater use, wrater exchanges,
and leasing water rights. Because no agency is empowered by Colorado law to consider, let alone protect, the public interest when
someone seeks to develop a water right, intervention by the Corps,
with its broad mandate, was the only means to account for public
values in the decision-making process. "2
2.

Involvement of multiple interests in localized decisions-an
unexpectedfederal role.

Nearly all the outside-the-box approaches that characterize the
most important water policy reforms of the 1990s depend on inclu257. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding
Corps's definition of the waters of the United States as extending to adjacent wetlands)
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
259. Id. § 1344(c).
260. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club
v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
261. See Daniel F. Luecke, Two Forks. The Rise and Fallof a Dam. 14 vr. Rssouctcss &
ENV'T:24 (1999).

262. Indeed, because the section 404 permitting process is a major federal action that
has a significant effect on the human environment, an environmental impact statement
must be prepared under National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c)
(1994), and the effects of permitting on endangered species must be assessed under Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(2) (1994). Se, also Riverside Irrigation Districts.
Andreus, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
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sive processes. They generally include, at the watershed or community level, representatives of many interests that were historically
excluded from formal state processes. The resulting shift in governance promotes local initiative and activism. Moreover, parties
who had in the past influenced decisions by elevating disputes to
the courts can now avoid litigation by using these new problemsolving institutions. Environmentalists, for instance, can participate in these processes in place of litigation, or after getting the
attention of regulated parties by bringing a lawsuit.
Several states have recognized the value of watershed-based decision making. Only Washington and Oregon have gone so far as
to pass laws to encourage and materially assist these groups in addressing a variety of watershed issues. 63 More typical are Idaho
and Montana, which have authorized watershed councils to work
with state agencies in developing watershed protection strategies. 2 4 Today, watershed-level programs are included as part of
the water quality programs in at least ten states. 65 Water quality
issues dominate the attention of most local watershed groups because the United States Environmental Protection Agency's watershed policy provides assistance and financial incentives, as well as a
way to avoid blanket federal regulation under the Clean Water
Act.

2 66

Federal agencies deserve a measure of the credit for the
proliferation of both macro and local watershed efforts. First, the
force of federal regulation induced the collaborative efforts of local interests in many cases. To the extent that local watershed efforts are designed to respond to the need for compliance with the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, or other federal
mandates, and federal agencies agree to participate and to accept
outcomes, the groups depend on federal cooperation for their success. In addition, much of the progress made by many watershed
groups results directly from the financial support provided by fed263. OR. REV. STAT. § 541.345 (1997); 1998 Wash. Laws 247 (codified at W"XsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.82.060 (West 1998)).
264. IDAHO CODE § 39-3615 (Michie 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-702 (1999).
265. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW,
RR-18, THE STATE RoLE IN WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES, 37-54 (1998).
266. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA840-S-96-001, WATERSHED APPROACH FRAMEWORK (1996) available at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/
framework.htmIl. See also OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA800-F-96001, WHY WATERSHEDS? (1996) available at http://www.epa.gov/OVOW/watershed/
why.htmi.
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2 67
eral agencies and the participation of federal agency personnel..
Federal support for collaborative processes is surprising because the applicable federal statutes unyieldingly demand compliance while providing no statutory support for the collaborative
approach. Certainly the most direct response by federal agencies
to a state's failure or refusal to respond to relatively clear federal
mandates, such as those provided by the ESA, would be to assume a
tougher regulatory stance. Indeed, if the agency is too compliant,
it risks suit by environmental groups who take a dim view of protracted collaboration in the face of apparent violations of the law.
Nevertheless, instead of meeting state resistance to federal regulation in the 1990s with greater force, the federal government displayed surprising agility and creativity by encouraging and
participating in alternative processes. -'
The federal agencies also face practical constraints and institutional disincentives to embrace multi-interest collaboration. Collaborative efforts can be protracted and expensive, and their
outcomes are always uncertain. They require agencies to commit
limited resources and personnel to seemingly endless meetings instead of simply enforcing the law. Moreover, officials must be open
to outsiders' suggestions for experimental approaches to compliance, and they may become involved in solving problems that go
beyond the federal mandate. For instance, benefits to sport fishing, aesthetics, and tourism may be urged as part of a consensus
solution to an endangered species problem.
Notwithstanding several constraints, the federal agencies have
actually become more flexible and innovative in accommodating
multiple interests. Policies have changed within the federal establishment; federal officials have been encouraged, at least by the
Clinton Administration, to participate in these processes.2 ' 9 This
change has required agency employees to learn new skills. Representatives of the BLM, the EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Bureau of Reclamation, and the Forest Service are now actively participating in collaborative processes..2 70 Notably, the Bureau of

267. See KF',,v, supra note 209, at 61-63 (finding that "(the Federal Government
plays a significant and essential role in the effective functioning of most watershed
initiatives").
268. See Tarlock, supra note 202, at 1641-44.
269. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, PubhcParticipationin EnvironientalDreisfoninaingat the
A L Rjv. 263
A.
New Millennium: StructuringNew Spheres of Publichfluenc4 26 B.C. E,
(1999).
270. See Coleman, supra note 203.
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Reclamation has redefined itself as a water management agency
committed to a broad range of purposes, not simply irrigation,
power 2generation,
and other uses historically associated with the
71
agency

The agencies' willingness to enable and participate in collaborative approaches may be seen as a politically expedient way to
avoid potential congressional backlash for pursuing tougher enforcement. It may also simply reflect the Clinton Administration's
approach to natural resources policy-an approach that may not
survive in subsequent administrations. Whatever the explanation,
the federal establishment has been a definitive force in the trend
toward localized and multi-interest water decision making.
3.

Problems with Depending on FederalMotivation

There are two problems with the current federal role. One is a
criticism by environmentalists, soundly based in the law, that federal agencies are supposed to enforce the laws rather than facilitate
compromise.2

72

When a federal agency plays the role of a

facilitator, it can blur the bright line of what should and should not
be permitted under federal law. The federal government has
unique missions in protecting species and habitats under federal
law, protecting navigable waters, asserting Indian water rights and
water rights for public lands, and dealing with international and
interstate water allocation. Matters like setting standards for clean
water or preventing loss of endangered species were the subject of
national legislation precisely because they were too important to be
left to the states or compromised for the sake of locally important
interests.273
The other problem with ceding responsibility to federal agencies for convening and implementing local and watershed-based
solutions to water problems is the converse of the first. Federal
programs inherently risk substituting national determinations of
the public interest for state or local judgments, even on local matters. Just as federal standards best protect and represent broad fed271. Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? PrivateRights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. Evm. LJ. 363 (1997).
272. See Michael McCloskey, Problems With Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental
Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. Rmv. 423 (2000).
273. Reed D. Benson, Recommendations for an Environmentally Sound Federal Policy on
Western Water, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1998).
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eral interests, some state and local interests need to be defined and
dealt with at a political level closer to the physical resource.
The best argument for federal deference to states in water allocation and policy is that it fosters practical approaches that tailor
water uses to local needs, customs, and conditions. But because
the states have not taken the lead in reconciling demands for more
diverse economic uses and competing demands to account for ecological, social, and aesthetic values, the federal government has filled the void. So far, it appears that the federal agencies are
committed to facilitating local problem solving through the macro
and local watershed approaches without substituting their judgment for that of local people. But there is no assurance that this
approach will survive future administrations or that federal agencies will not simply lose patience with these lengthy collaborative
processes.
IV.

THE FuTuRE OF STATE WATER POLIGc

REFORIM

States may yet assert greater leadership in responding to public
demands for change in water policy. In doing so, they could supplant much of the federal role in wrater use and development decisions and move decision-making power to the parties closest to the
affected ecosystems. If so, they may yet achieve the objectives set by
western governors in the 1980s. The question is whether and when
conditions will ever be ripe for change.

A.

It Takes a Cisis

The experience of the 1980s and 1990s cautions against expecting the states to initiate water policy reform without the pressure of
a crisis. The four Park City Workshops led to solid agreement on
the Park City Principles but consensus on good policy was not
enough to ensure political action,27 4 and the governors' call for
change was not matched with significant action.
Recently, the western governors embraced a set of principles, in
a policy statement creatively named "Enlibra," that in man) respects parallel the Park City Principles. - 5 The components of Enlibra include collaboration, use of local solutions to meet national
274. See Bell et al., supra note 44.
275. See generaly, Richard Halvey & Karen Deike, UnleashingEnlibra,17 E-wrt. FoRUt'
20 (2000). For commentary on Enlibra, see David J. Hayes, Old i7ne in New 5911k% 17
ENvrL. FORUM 24 (2000); Robert Wiygul, Pinciples Ignore Pkaliie, 17 Ewn.. Fontt 26
'stern
(2000). See also, Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Diretions in
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standards, recognition that solutions cannot be limited by political
boundaries, and use of markets instead of mandates.27 6 Although
not specific to water, these Enlibra principles could be used to
guide water policy reform. Again, though, the experience of the
1990s cautions against optimism and teaches that political rhetoric,
even by an apparently committed coalition of state governors, is
not enough to produce political action.
To provoke change, there must be tangible and relatively immediate consequences to inaction, and nothing galvanizes political
will like a crisis. 277 For example, changes in California water law
during the 1990s arose from relatively immediate threats of actual
water shortages from limited supplies for a rapidly growing population. In addition, California faced restrictions under federal regulations that could curtail existing water uses. Federal regulatory
pressures also accounted for many of the modest changes elsewhere in the country. Crises furnish a window of opportunity-a
moment when it is politically feasible for states to address placespecific problems and broader policy issues through legislation as
well as administrative and judicial decisions.
Inevitably, there will be crises. Three of the most obvious
sources of stress that may provoke crises in the near future are
demographics, the impacts of present policies such as federal environmental statutes, and climate variability. The extent and success
of future reforms in state water law and policy will depend on how
well prepared the states are to act when these or other stresses provide opportunities for change.
1. Demographic changes.

The West is the fastest growing, most urbanized region in the
country. Policies embedded in western water law were designed to
promote rapid settlement and development. Today, however, the
dominant problem for the West is not how to promote growth, but
how to manage it.27 8 Nevertheless, few states have adopted effective land use controls.279 Most of them leave the task to local govWaterLaw: Conflict or Collaboration,20 LAND, RESOuRCES & EtqVTL. L. 15, 28-29 (2000) (com-

paring Park City Principles with Enlibra).
276. See Halvey & Deike, supra note 275.
277. The perception that crisis is a prerequisite to political action is commonly held.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for "crises" to be concocted in order to draw attention to
the need for change. See FRANK WELSH, How TO CREATE A WATER Cisis 3, 4 (1985).
278. See Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 86.
279. See sources cited supra note 189.
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ernments, and none have integrated water planning with land use
planning.
California and Texas show large population increases from
births and immigration. Those states alone will account for about
half of the nation's total growth from 1995-2025. Growth in the
interior West will be concentrated in what some researchers have
termed "urban archipelagos"--dense, metropolitan areas surrounded by sparsely populated rural areas..2" The urban areas that
will drive most of the West's expansion in water demand are distant
from water sources and are already confronting the limits of their
existing supplies. Water sources presently available in the West will
be sufficient to accommodate growth in the foreseeable future only
if water is moved from existing agricultural uses into urban uses. - 8'
Making these shifts in water use portends economic and social dislocation and may require a proliferation of proposals for new facilities-dams and pipelines-as well as pressures for further
depletion of streamflows. The impacts resulting from attempts to
satisfy the demands of population growth consequently will create
major environmental challenges and contribute to the kinds of crises that may be necessary to force the political action needed to
make real changes in water policy.
2.

Impacts of current use and policy.

The application of water law and policy can itself put pressures
on the system, contributing to the likelihood of a crisis. This is, of
course, true when old policies are inflexible and fail to respond to
broader values and changing conditions, but it is also true of apparently progressive policies that demand environmental protection and more services from existing supplies.
The law's chronic inattention to degradation and depletion of
supplies can create stresses as it has in the past. Take the example
of groundwater laws. The failure to respond to problems of aquifer depletion and contamination can curtail production from present sources and create problems that cannot be solved within the
planning horizon of most water managers. In some aquifers,
recharge occurs slowly, or only over geologic time making it critical
to manage the pace of depletion. Eventually, groundwater mining
can ruin the economies of entire regions, such as the threat faced
280. See AvisoRy COLM'N,, WATER 1N THE WEST,supra note 33, at 2-14 to 2-18.
281. See LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, MovingAgztiutltfral Water to Cities:
The Seardfor Smarter Approadwes, 2 HAsrn-cs W.-N.W J. Ew . L & PoL'v 27 (1994).
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by the several states overlying the Ogallala Aquifer, whose econo282
mies are based on irrigated agriculture.
Pollution of surface or groundwater can also render some
sources of water useless for the foreseeable future. Contaminated
groundwater sources are especially difficult to rehabilitate. One
specific groundwater problem needing attention in many areas is
salt water intrusion that is caused when pumping in coastal areas
draws sea water into a freshwater aquifer.2 83 If present supplies are
diminished as a result, especially as demand increases, it will accelerate and exacerbate water crises.
The application of environmental laws and ostensibly progressive water laws can also create significant pressures. Although intended to add balance to the system, they effectively impose new
demands on a fixed supply. The provision of additional services
(such as legal requirements that protect fish and wildlife, wetlands,
wilderness values, water quality, and flowing streams) limits the
amount of water that can be extracted and the ways and places in
which water can be developed. When the government or a citizens' group moves to enforce requirements under laws like the Endangered Species Act, 28 4 Glean Water Act §404,285 the Federal
Power Act,28 6 and the Grand Canyon Protection Act, 28 7 it can create "shortages" and contribute to conditions that form a crisis.
Similarly, while laws promoting efficiency and conservation are
generally salutary and are part of the law reform agenda, their implementation can cause stresses. Historically, most water in the
West was allocated to inefficient agricultural uses and some states
adopted apparently irrational barriers to transferring water to
more efficient uses. One response has been to liberalize market
transfers to take advantage of overly generous (or wasteful) appropriations for agriculture. 288 The efficiency gains resulting from
transfers, however, can remove a margin of safety from the system
and reduce streamflows that were incidentally maintained by the
282. See SANDRA POSTEL, PILLAR OF SAND: CAN THE IRRIGATION MIRACLE LAST? 77

(1999).
283. JAMES WILSON, ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES, GROUNDWATER: A NoN-TEcUINI
CAL GUIDE 48, 50 (1982).
284. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
285. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
286. 16 U.S.C. § 791a-828c.
287. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.

102-575, 106 Stat. 4600.
288. See supra Part II.B.6.
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"slack" in the system. The pressures of shortages may be more
sharply and immediately felt by water users as the system becomes
more efficient. In fact, the "inefficiencies" of over-stating rights
and applying excessive quantities of irrigation water, much of
which seeps back to surface or groundwater, has provided a cushion to ameliorate environmental impacts of consumptive uses.
Generally speaking, the most efficient application of water to
consumptive uses tends to be at odds with non-consumptive uses,
like fishing and boating. When transfers move water out of one
geographic area or economic sector for the sake of another, such
as a trans-basin diversion or a transfer from agricultural to urban
uses, they can cause pressures on the system. If purchasers of old
agricultural rights for urban uses divert the same quantities of
water, they may actually decrease the amount of water that was returned to streams and aquifers by "inefficient" agricultural applications. Similarly, lining irrigation ditches saves water, but may
incidentally dry up wetlands sustained by excess seepage of
wastewater.
In addition, transfers can cause economic and social dislocations. As with problems caused when greater accuracy and precision in using water removes the buffer against environmental
impacts of present uses, the solution is not to perpetuate inefficiency but to account for the consequences more completely and
thoughtfully in decision-making processes.
3.

Climate variability.

Climate impacts inevitably will contribute to future water crises.
While demographics and the impacts of policy create stresses that
set the stage for water crises, the perceptions of a crisis will almost
always be triggered by a climate event. Although the timing and
extent of climate variability are uncertain, the occurrence of climate events is a certainty. These events will be the most readily
identifiable antecedents to crisis situations of a magnitude sufficient to attract the political attention needed for significant water
policy reform.
There are three distinct kinds of climate variability that can affect water supply: cyclical variations, severe drought, and longterm climate change. Seasonal and annual cycles cause precipitation, snowpack, and river flows to vary widely in the West. The extent of these cyclical variations, which can be enormous, are
predicted based on historical records. Planners project the "safe

64

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:3

yield" of supply sources and available reservoir storage based on
long-term statistical averages. They attempt to secure sufficient
supplies to satisfy demand projections. Cyclical variations are unlikely to trigger crises unless they coincide with other stresses.
Severe droughts, like major floods, are inevitable but infrequent events, and they cause significant challenges for water planning. These extreme events are included in the long-term
statistical averages used to project safe yield. Planners who design
water storage and distribution systems generally focus only on the
normal ranges, leaving open the possibility of shortages from
droughts. Drought, therefore, can cause impacts severe enough to
constitute a crisis and thereby arouse public concern and political
action.
Long-term climate change may exacerbate the impacts of cyclical variations and severe droughts.289 Identifying and predicting
climate change is a developing field and, while there is broad consensus among scientists that human activities are altering the
global climate, significant uncertainty remains about the likely effects of climate change on regional water resources. 90 In practice,
long-term climate change has not generally been considered or reflected in water managers' plans, let alone in the decision-making
framework of institutions charged with shaping water policy. This
is perhaps to be expected in light of the apparent uncertainty in
the data. Even if different climate models agree on the range of
expected changes in temperatures, they may disagree on the impacts it will have on runoff and on water supplies. Moreover, most
research has produced gross predictions that are for large areas of
the globe but which may not be reliable for a region or specific
watershed. The risks of over-reacting or under-reacting to the data
are equally troubling. Although the evolving science of climate
change can be perplexing, it is possible for scientists to interpret
289. See generally, JOHN FIROR, THE CHANGING ATMOSPHERE: A GLOBA. CHALLENGE
(1990); KENNETH D. FREDERICK & PETER H. GLIUCK, WATER AND GLOBAL CLIMATE Change:

Potential Impacts on U.S. Water Resources (1999); Nigel W. Arnell, Climate Change and
Global Water Resources, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE S31 (1999); William W. Kellogg, Human
Impact on Climate: The Evolution of an Awareness, in SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO REGIONAL CLI.
MIATIC CHANGE: FORECASTING By ANALOGY (Michael H. Glantz ed., 1988); William E. Riebsame, Adjusting Water Resource Management to Climate Change, 13 CLIMATIC CL'NGE 69
(1988); Ernest T. Smerdon, Impact of Global Change on Water Resources, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 155 (1992).
290. See Martin Parry, et al., The Global Impact of Climate Change: A New Assessment, 9
GLOBAL ENvrL. CHANGE S1 (1999); The Science of Global Change: IntergovernmentalPanel on
Climate Change, 9 Aiz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 9 (1992).
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the modeling results and to use the available data to develop realistic scenarios to guide the planning and problem-solving process.Episodes of actual or anticipated water shortage have always excited popular and political interest in water problems. The resulting attention to actual or anticipated supply problems opens a
window of opportunity for water policy reform. This does not
mean that a climate event or trend will effectively focus attention
on the problem of how to anticipate or adapt to future problems of
climate variability. In practice, legislatures may respond to a natural climate variation by initiating a politically popular project or
program, such as building a dam. If the response addresses the
climate event at all, it may be only temporary, as was a xwater marketing scheme implemented in California during the drought of
the late 1980s.2 92 Unlike other crisis-provoking stresses, climate vuriability is not human-induced, reasonably predictable, nor controllable by laws and institutions. These facts make climate variability a
uniquely difficult issue for policy-makers to address.
Crisis response would be more likely and better able to account
for climate variability, especially long-term climate trends, if policymakers consulted more directly and consistently with climate experts. In addition to assisting with data interpretation, these experts could help develop appropriate water policies. If successful
water policy reform depends on advance formulation of sound proposals, then climate experts should be included in the place-specific, outside-the-box efforts that anticipate rather than respond to
crises. They then will be better prepared to test approaches to solving water problems and to glean transferable experiences for application when the opportunity to institutionalize them arises.
The key to using crisis-driven opportunities for iwater reform is
to engage people who can influence policy change. This will be
the most difficult challenge for such projects. Unlike earlier
changes in western water law, many of the latest reform proposals
threaten established interests. In the past, changes in state w%-ater
law and policy were relatively modest and designed to facilitate
water allocation and development. Today's water decisions are far
more complex and their resolution requires including a variety of
291.

Cf Richard W Katz, Statistics of Cinale Change: Implications for Scenario Dadop-

men, in SocIErAL RESPONSES To REGIONAML CULIMic C IaE: FoREcsNG BY ANAZLOt Y

(Michael H. Glantz ed., 1988).
292. See Brian E. Gray, The Market and tMe Communiuy: Lessons From California'sDrought
IlaterBank; 1 West-NAV. 17 (1994).
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previously unrepresented interests because of the panoply of interests the public has in the environmental, economic, and social consequences, and because the growth of municipal demands is
testing the limits of available supplies. Well-established interests
with great influence in state politics, such as special districts and
state agencies, are rightly concerned by the prospect of change.
The boards and employees of these districts and agencies perceive
that changing policies may threaten their hegemony. Reform will
result in reallocating some water rights, and interests who are favored by the status quo understandably will resist change. Indeed,
these traditional institutions appear willing to risk gradual obsolescence rather than suffering an immediate marginal loss of economic and political influence by opening the process to other
interests, values, and people.
B.

Between Crises: Outside-the-Box Approaches as Laboratoriesfor
BroaderReforms

If sound state water policy reform proposals are developed in
advance, they can be put forward when crisis arrives. Today's
outside-the-box projects targeted at solving particular, local
problems can be useful laboratories for developing and testing policies and approaches that could be applied more broadly. The proposals will then be ready when opportunities for broader reforms
arise. Localized processes can provide opportunities for refining
methods for including multiple parties and dealing with multiple
issues. Because state water agencies, with rare exceptions, have not
attempted to deal with such complexities, meaningful change in
these institutions must involve procedural changes that open up
the scope of issues and parties before them. The solutions developed in the outside-the-box approaches should also be catalogued
for consideration by problem solvers in the future. Measures created to respond to place-specific issues may be transferable to comparable situations elsewhere.
Outside-the-box efforts have proliferated because people with a
stake in a particular, localized issue or problem perceived the potential for developing a viable solution and understood that the
consequences of failure could be grave and imminent. Apart from
more pervasive crises, these multi-interest, place-specific problemsolving processes will likely continue producing the most significant changes in water policy, as they respond to the exigencies of
localized problems.
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There may always be a place for extraordinary, targeted efforts
like CALFED or the Adaptive Management Work Group on the
Lower Colorado River. However, states should build upon the local approach and formulate proposals for integrating some of the
processes and solutions that have emerged in the several outsidethe-box approaches of the 1990s into established institutions for
water governance. The place-specific projects have experimented
with encouraging more open and inclusive public participation
and they represent attempts to address a wide range of interconnected issues ranging from environmental to economic, rather
than focusing only on water allocation or development. Many of
them involve integrated consideration of environmental preservation or restoration, habitat protection, demand-side management
such as conservation measures, land use controls, and the use of
markets and pricing.
The outside-the-box efforts also are worthy of special study and
attention. In attempts to glean lessons that could reform and improve institutions, a host of questions needs to be asked to understand which aspects of the outside-the-box-approaches used during
this period merit emulation. Inquiries must look at process-who
participates, what motivates the participants, how problems are
identified and framed, and how the effort is organized. The), must
also examine the kinds of solutions that emerge and identify ubiquitous or typical elements.
Potential research topics include assessing the importance of
leadership, asking whether consensus decision making or majority
rule is more effective, determining if the presence, absence or type
of federal participation correlates to the success or failure of the
effort, and assessing how the availability or lack of scientific and
technical expertise has influenced group effectiveness. The answers to these questions will inform efforts to improve local groups,
and also provide information on how to reshape permanent institutions to make them more effective in making water decisions.
Efforts to solve water problems benefit from access to sound
technical and scientific information and judgment. Thus, if
outside-the-box approaches are to serve as laboratories to incubate
components of water reform, they should not be handicapped by
inadequate scientific and technical expertise. Scientific experts,
from within and outside state agencies, including hydrologists, biologists, agronomists, foresters, and meteorologists can bring essential information and valuable insights to water policy
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discussions. Yet, it has been rare for these experts to participate in
formulating, or even advising on the wisdom or timing of policy
initiatives. In the past, their involvement in water policy decisionmaking has been limited to addressing narrow issues or evaluating
proposals already developed by policy-makers. There are, of
course, impediments. It will be difficult to sustain sufficient interest and effort among experts who do not know whether and when
the results of their input and efforts will be seriously considered.
And it may be impossible to engage "establishment" water interests
who are threatened by the prospect of any change.
Climate experts, in particular, have been consulted infrequently and, indeed, have made little effort to relate their data and
research to actual problems or policies. I have suggested that climate variability is the stress most likely to trigger crises offering
policy reform opportunities. Given the endemic uncertainty in climate models and predictions, scientists are especially needed to
interpret and assist in the rational application of the best data available. Failing to consider and react appropriately to emerging information on long-term trends could be a fatal flaw in any solutions
that are developed. This argues for involving, or at least consulting, climate experts in most aspects of water policy and planning,
from local and macro-watershed efforts to formulation of broader
policies. They should assist in both preparing for the physical manifestations of climate variations as well as in predicting when there
may be a coincidence of stresses that creates the crisis-driven opportunity for reform.
Greater involvement of scientific experts in policy making requires not only expanding the decision-makers' appreciation of the
value of scientific input. It also requires that scientists recognize
the value of applying their work to influence better solutions to
real world problems. Because the immediate material and professional rewards are often small, scientists may not find it attractive to
become committed to long-term involvement in solving the
problems of a single, local group. Experts may, however, be attracted to working with local groups if their contributions to solving immediate and local problems may also contribute significantly
to broader policy reform.
Political leaders, administrators, and academics interested in
water reform, as well as the immediately affected participants,
should become involved in these efforts because of the potential
for transferring specific solutions, and approaches to finding solu-
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tions, to other situations. Indeed, these local efforts are the proving grounds for the solutions and approaches suggested by
reformers and embraced by the western governors in the 1980s.
The continuing need for creative institutional responses was
emphasized in the recent report of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, which called for improved governance
of water through "integration of federal programs with state, tribal,
and local efforts." 29 3 Although it is possible to reinvigorate the
state role in water policy, it is unrealistic to expect that pervasive
policy development will proceed rationally and at an even pace.
The light of political attention shines on water issues only episodically, typically in times of stress, when there appears to be a crisis in
the availability or condition of resources. And producing carefully
considered, well-informed solutions in a crisis atmosphere is awkward and unpromising. In the midst of a perceived crisis, however,
states can seize opportunities for making incremental changes by
institutionalizing the reforms pioneered by groups involved in
outside-the-box efforts. They can assimilate these experiences as
models for alleviating broader problems and reforming out-dated
state laws and institutions at the same time as they contribute to
coordinating various place-specific efforts. Even when reform legislation does not succeed, the state legislative debate may incite action and agreements by others. -9 4
V.

CONCLUSION

The issues in western water today are far more complex than in
the days when the West's outmoded policies were being formed.
Initially, policies simply allowed users to do as they pleased, and
state water laws and institutions were created to facilitate and mediate productive use of water as a tool for expanding the economy of
the West. Water could be developed without considering the impacts on anyone or anything but the uses of other water rights
holders.
Later, the essential goal became finding and developing new
supplies. Financial support was needed for building structures to
transport or store water and this aspect of water policy became cen293. See ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN T E WEs'r, supra note 33, at cxxi.
294. See LkRRv MORANDI, RETHINKING NVESrEPR-N VkrER POucv .ASSESSING MHE
LNirrs

OF LEGISLATION (1994) (concluding, based on several case studies, that the legislative process can be valuable in resolving differences and promoting better water use and other
progressive goalh).
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tralized, often at the federal level. The beneficiaries of projects
and the states accepted conditions and controls in exchange for
federal funding. They and the federal government focused almost
entirely on engineering feasibility and not on the economic, environmental, or social impacts of the projects.
A plethora of problems resulting from unregulated appropriation and subsidized development are now widely acknowledged, including inefficient use, damage to natural systems, social and
economic impacts of moving water from agricultural to urban uses,
and pollution caused by return flows and depletions. The unconsidered or unintended environmental consequences of past development decisions have become current problems, especially with
the rise in public demand for environmental quality. But solutions
to these problems have been frustrated by the physical and legal
commitment of resources to particular uses. Dams and canals tied
water to places and uses, and vested property rights in water made
changes more costly. Now, public preferences for conserving resources for both economic and ecological reasons are respected in
laws that confront head-on the old, inflexible water laws and
policies.
As national environmental goals were asserted in federal laws
and as federal funds grew more scarce, the national government
retreated from major water development subsidies. Eventually, the
best sites for dams were used up and most proposals for developing
major new supplies encountered environmental conflicts. Federal
agencies became more active in enforcing environmental laws that
frustrated both public and private water development attempts.
Meanwhile, state laws changed little to adapt to the new situation
of the West.
Today there is greater competition than ever for water. Dramatic demographic changes are occurring in the West because of
unprecedented population growth and concentration of human
settlements in urban areas. Demands for water for urban uses are
expanding, although much of the West's water is still committed
legally to agricultural uses. At the same time, we understand the
limits of nature better than ever. The public increasingly appreciates the value of protecting ecosystems as well as conserving natural
amenities for human enjoyment, and there are strong political constituencies that oppose environmentally damaging construction or
operation of water facilities. Nearly all the practicably developable
supplies are fully committed or unavailable because of the environ-
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mental damage that would be caused by developing it. These concerns substantially limit the option of increasing water supplies
through construction of new dams and canals. Existing supplies
therefore must be stretched through demand management and
some water must be moved from old to new uses.
These phenomena have combined to incite advocacy for policy
reform. The suggested solutions include integrating water planning with other interests, such as land use; using market forces to
enable efficient water transfers; allowing greater public participation; regulating to protect instream flows needed for fish and wildlife and recreation and to prevent pollution; and satisfying the
public interest in water decisions. Public officials in the West embraced these approaches in the 1980s and seemed to have an
agenda for state water policy reform.
During the 1990s, however, the western states made little progress on the water reform agenda. Yet changes did occur, largely
because the federal government pressed its regulatory requirements and local interests responded with a combination of civic
responsibility and practicality to find place-specific solutions.
Thus, water reform along the lines proposed by state leaders in the
1980s advanced in the 1990s in spite of the states' inaction.
Although the reasons for reform persist and are better understood than ever, existing state legal and institutional frameworks
endure virtually unchanged. Vocal interests with expectations or
vested rights rooted in old policies typically resist proposals to
widen the interests represented in water decisions or to dedicate
more water to instream uses. Proponents of reform, ranging from
environmentalists to urban suppliers to commercial recreational
users to scientists, are numerous, but are not part of a unified political movement. Consequently, measurable progress in dealing
with the inadequacies of water policy has tended to be particularized to situations where the stakes of success or failure remained
clearly in view, where the reasons for alliances among diverse proponents seemed obvious, and where opponents saw the inevitability of change. Apart from these outside-the-box efforts, w%-ater law
and policy remain largely unaltered.
Developing wise policies is a long-term, ongoing process. However, opportunities to implement broad changes in water policy are
likely to occur only episodically and, therefore, thoughtful and
workable policies need to be ready when the opportunities to institutionalize change arise. Outside-the-box approaches, like those
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that emerged in the 1990s, can be valuable laboratories for cultivating the elements of broadly applicable institutional reforms. If
states recognize this opportunity, they can play a role in institutionalizing these efforts. States can and should formulate integrated
water policies and new institutions that are relevant to the issues of
the twenty-first century. If they do not, western water policy will
continue to change-but it will change in spite of, rather than because of, states' efforts.

